Murray Kempton

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China Today

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Wilson versus Kennedy

★ After a family dinner following the inaugural parade 50 years ago, Woodrow Wilson retired about midnight. Shortly thereafter his bell summoned a White House doorkeeper. The servant found the iron-willed new President, with his long, aggressive, equine face, clothed only in his long underwear. The trunk was at the station with the Presidential nightshirts. When it arrived Wilson had already retired. . . .

Fifty years ago! The era is almost forgotten. And yet as we watched Washington last week – the sluggish Congress, the embroiled President – we wondered if there were any connection.

Mr. Kennedy is known to admire Wilson. There is the same intellectual bent, swift and orderly mind and feeling for history; above all a tremendous sense of the meaning of the Presidency. Each accepted responsibility for the prosperity of business and the national welfare; each was pragmatic rather than philosophical. A deep reserve in each, furthermore, brought leadership that the people might trust and admire, but rarely love.

In 1913, Democrats captured the Senate for the first time in 16 years: 51 Democrats, 44 Republicans and 1 Progressive. Everything depended on the organization of the all-powerful committees. Wilson could probably count on 51 votes (including 10 Republicans) for the main planks of the radical Baltimore platform. What happened has recently been told by Senator Clark, who sought a repeat performance.

The Wilson party reconstituted committee membership, upset senior chairmen, and chose John W. Kern, Indiana, as caucus leader, a man with only two years' tenure. In a great legislative liberal burst 50 years ago they passed the Underwood tariff, the Federal Trade Act, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the Farm Credit Act, the Adamson 8-hour day for railroads and created the Federal Reserve system.

The striking thing here is that Wilson had a majority, and it acted; President Kennedy almost certainly now has a majority and it hesitates. Wilson had the advantage of being able to crystallize half a century of Populist agitation, but he also had the driving force of personal belief, a stubborn and rather limited Presbyterian moralism that was not particularly attractive but was like the gunpowder behind the artillery shell of total commitment.

"The success of a party means little except when the Nation is using the party for a large and definite purpose," he said. He lacked the common touch, he loved humanity in the abstract, he sometimes placed the halo of moral necessity on expediency, but he had a Dream, backed with driving and tremendous prose and, as James Truslow Adams wrote, for a time he gave "once more to the people a vision of nobility and importance in their life and destiny that none save Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln had yet been able to kindle for them."

Wilson had that little eagle, Carter Glass, to lead the Reserve Board fight out of his wry lips. ("Think of the things Carter would say," it was said of him, "if he talked out of *both* sides of his mouth!")

Not Even a Vote

★ No comparison over 50 years is wholly fair; Congress has weakened itself. It is imprisoned in its own procedure, capable of efficient function only in an emergency. Where are the Glasses, the LaFollettes, the Borahs of yesterday? There are a few but they wade in a quagmire. Where else in a Western land today can the chairman of a legislative committee simply pocket a bill from the Executive Branch and refuse to let it come to a vote? Furthermore, some bills were passed in the last Congress by House and Senate, but then the Rules Committee declined to let conferees meet to compromise differences. It is one thing to have an Administration bill defeated, but it is another not to be able even to have it *submitted* to vote of the whole Congress.

Mr. Kennedy, perhaps, operates under more difficulties in Congress than Wilson and he may still be conscious of his close election. But things may not get better for him; after all, if re-elected, Congress will then be thinking of his heir.

Personal Intervention

★ Did Wilson participate in the Underwood tariff fight? He did. He lashed out at lobbyists who operated as they do today on the tax bill; he appeared in person, with embarrassing frequency, at committee room conferences of Senators (he had revived the practice, dropped by Jefferson, of delivering messages to joint sessions in person). He lacked the power of the two Roosevelts to wheedle and cow individual Congressmen, but he kept up a steady stream of influence, and he appealed everlastingly to the public.

Wilson was surprisingly flexible, at least in the first term, but he did not abandon principle. Today one cannot be sure whether it is flexibility or opportunism. One recalls the drug bill fight last year, where Mr. Kennedy's representatives on the Hill were negotiating with Senator Dirksen to cut the heart out of the measure behind the back of its sponsor, Senator Kefauver, before it was suddenly rescued by the thalidomide horror.

Again, as *NYPost* reporter William Shannon points out, Mr. Kennedy has just sent an "eloquent, beautifully-written" message on civil rights to Congress. He did this, however, after abstaining for six weeks from any part in the liberals' vain effort to curb the filibuster, the only condition on which major civil rights legislation has hope of passage.

Some liberals shrug their shoulders over the Administration; not TRB. But on the 50th anniversary of Mr. Wilson, that man of passionate commitment, we do wish Mr. Kennedy could somehow convey a greater sense of emotional involvement in the excellent measures he sponsors, and that he would do more of an educational job with the public, even though for the time being he fails.

My, my! What Wilson might have done in the League fight, if he had had Kennedy's tool of television!

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THE WEEK

3. A Second Blockade?; What Ads Do you Run; Civil Rights Message; Bullets of Light; Disestablishmentarianism; Landmark in Labor Relations

ARTICLES

8. Placing General de Gaulle
by Raymond Aron
9. Merchant of Nassau
by Denis Healey
11. Malaysia
by Denis Warner
13. Impurities in Yorkville
by Murray Kempton
15. The New Court
by Alexander M. Bickel
17. Beyond Imperialism
by George Lichtheim
19. Red China Today
by Jacques Jacquet-Francillon

DEPARTMENTS

22. Books 25. Art 27. Films
28. Television 30. Correspondence

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A Second Blockade?

Among the Senators and Representatives clamoring for a "harder" line on Cuba only Senator Goldwater has declared himself ready to accept the consequences of overturning the Administration's policy of "containment." Goldwater wants a total blockade, now. Not a blockade to assure the elimination of offensive weapons – for that has been accomplished – but a blockade to overthrow the Castro regime. Like all such straight-forward, simple remedies, it has a certain attraction that may, as time and Castro go on, draw more and more support both from politicians who find it a useful club with which to beat the Administration and from plain citizens who have had enough of Communism and the training of subversives on their back step. But how well does blockade stand up when examined in the light of principle and prudence?

The Charter of Bogota, to which the US is pledged, provides in Article 15 that, "No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed attack but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against the political, economic and cultural elements." In other hemispheric declarations and in the United Nations Charter the US has repeatedly subscribed to the principle of non-aggression. And again last week Mr. Kennedy disclaimed any intent to start a war over Cuba.

The President's critics may reply that as regards Cuba the US must rise above principle, disregard its pledged word, and do for the Cubans what they cannot now do, but presumably would like to do, for themselves. Suppose for a moment that one goes along with this judgment. Is blockade the best method of returning Cuba to the American family – or, for that matter, to the Cuban people?

The most important effect of a blockade would be to stop oil shipments. Indeed, a blockade restricted to oil would suffice to achieve Goldwater's purpose. Petroleum is Cuba's only source of energy. In pre-Castro times it imported 60,000 barrels of oil a day. Tankers could be spotted and either diverted or destroyed by the US Navy and Air Force. The whole economy would before long come to a grinding halt. Of course, there is the problem of what the Russians, who have invested considerable prestige in Castro's survival, might do. Would they, as Khrushchev threatens, retaliate – if not directly against the Continental US, then indirectly, say in Berlin? We don't know,

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but the question appears to have only marginal interest to the advocates of blockade. They seem willing to confront the Russians anywhere, any time, whatever the issue, because they assume either: (1) that Communists never mean what they say and will always back down when faced with force, and that therefore there is no serious risk of world war; or (2) that there *is* a serious risk of war, but that "having it out" is preferable to an ambiguous and frustrating stalemate. Neither hypothesis is self-evident. The Soviet response, however, is not all that must be taken into account. There is Latin America too.

Here it is worth recalling the fact that Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia abstained from voting on one part of the OAS resolution of last October, sanctioning an embargo for the limited purpose of forcing dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons. They feared that even this limited declaration might imply an approval of more severe sanctions against Cuba. It's true, of course, that the US has the power to blockade Cuba even if Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia disapprove. But wait. Senator Goldwater believes the US must prevent the spread of Communism in Latin America. How will that purpose be served by showing contempt for Latin American opinion?

Then there are the NATO partners. To persuade West European governments and private shippers to cut off entirely oil shipments to Cuba would mean little: these shipments are already negligible. Western Europe, therefore, must do more; it must endorse (help enforce?) a blockade of Soviet and Soviet-chartered tankers, even at the risk of war. Would that cooperation be forthcoming? And would Western Europe vote with the US when the Cuban delegate appeared before the UN and asked for UN censure of a US blockade? Or do the President's critics believe that here, too, it matters little what the Europeans think because we don't need them. If that is the case, if they are expendable, why all the bother and expenditure on NATO?

Perhaps we are exaggerating the dangers of a blockade policy. So let us assume that it all goes the way Senator Goldwater wants: a blockade is imposed, the Russians back down, Latin America does not kick up a storm, our Western allies rally 'round, the UN does not censure the US. Then what? The Cuban economy would be in ruins. Would that be the time for another invasion? Or would some Cuban military officers decide that capitulation was preferable to chaos. Perhaps. And then? Castro is assassinated; a "friendly" military junta announces that it has taken power. But a remnant of die-hard radicals in the militia Castro has armed will still have guns. Will they not use them? Isn't a protracted civil war the likely result? Nevertheless, Castro will have been overthrown.

What does the US do with this "victory"? It could not reasonably expect the streets of Havana to be lined with cheering throngs, ready to welcome the gringos who had reduced them to ruin. Something in the nature of a military occupation would probably be necessary. If the ruling junta were incapable of maintaining order, US troops might be needed for a protracted anti-guerrilla war in the hills.

If these are the consequences of Goldwater's policy, do we want them? If they are not, could Goldwater and the President's other critics show us the picture *they* have sketched in their dreambooks?

What Ads Do You Run

Sometimes a nightmare, with all its unreality, leaves us with a lucid insight into a segment of reality. So it is with the New York newspaper strike. When Mrs. Schiff of the *New York Post* resigned from the nightmare and decided to resume publication, Macy's decided to punish her by withholding its advertising from her. And so we have not necessarily a clarification of the relationship between the press as a whole and advertising interests, but an uncommonly clear insight into the truth of the relationship between a large advertiser and any single newspaper, especially a weak one. It appears not to be the case that the advertising dollar is spent purely on the basis of a commercial judgment.

If Macy's feels justified in punishing Mrs. Schiff because she pursued a wrong policy *vis-à-vis* her fellow publishers on the one hand, and Mr. Powers' typographical union on the other, what in the world is to stop Macy's from similarly punishing Mrs. Schiff for backing the wrong Presidential candidate? Why, nothing, except that in recent years Macy's has presumably not felt as strongly about Presidential candidacies as it does about employer solidarity.

Perhaps we should add that there is another side to this particular coin. While Macy's was saying that it chose not to advertise in Mrs. Schiff's newspaper, Mrs. Schiff was saying that the *Post* would not accept an ad announcing that former *Post*-columnist Murray Kempton now appears in *The New Republic*.

Civil Rights Message

"In the last two years, more progress has been made in securing the civil rights of all Americans than in any comparable period in our history." Thus said President Kennedy in the first full-scale message on civil rights that he has sent to Congress since he has been in office. As in the two-year record of the Administration, so in this message, the major emphasis is on the right to vote. The premise that this right "is a potent key to achiev-

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ing other rights of citizenship" is unexceptionable. But the Administration's extraordinary emphasis on the right to vote seems to proceed rather from the premise that this right is the *most* potent, possibly the sole necessary, key. And this premise may be thought somewhat naïve by students of American society.

Aside from urging that the life of the Civil Rights Commission, which has amply earned the right to live, be extended for another four years, the President makes but two legislative proposals that do not deal with the right to vote. One is trivial in the extreme: elimination of the separate-but-equal clause in the 100-year-old Morrill Land Grant College Act, a clause which is as good as non-existent anyway, because it is unconstitutional. The other such proposal is that HEW's Office of Education be authorized to extend technical and financial aid to school districts that are in the process of integrating. This is a worthy proposal, but an important half of it needs no legislation, at least to begin with. Technical assistance can be extended by executive action implementing the broad authority embodied in the statute – also some 100 years old – that created the Office of Education.

As to voting, the President offers a number of suggestions aimed at expediting the process by which the Department of Justice is able to move the courts to move state officials to stop discriminatory registration practices. There may be grounds for objection on one or two matters of detail, but on the whole, these suggestions should all be acted upon. They would all be helpful in implementing the policy of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. It may only be remarked that some of the delays the President justly complains of are the result of unreviewable discretionary actions of Southern federal judges who are unsympathetic to the policies of these Acts, and that a few of the President's own judicial appointments have unfortunately added to the number of such judges.

Bullets of Light

In the past year, the public has been exposed to a mixture of loose speculation, misinformation, and just plain propaganda – much of it inspired by defense contractors – about the military potential of a device called the laser. The word is an acronymn for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation; the device is, in a very loose sense, a special type of lamp.

The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* published last August an article that claimed, "If laser techniques advance as rapidly as is expected, lasers may replace almost all existing weapons, from the hand gun to the air defense missile to the anti-missile missile." Forgetting that light beams do not penetrate fog, rain and snow very well, the writer added that lasers "can replace radar and be far more efficient"; and he concluded that "the death ray . . . is now a reality." In last month's *Reader's Digest*, one of that publication's editors stated that secret military projects are now under way to develop giant lasers that will emit bullets of light to vaporize metal thousands of miles away. He quotes General LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, to the effect that lasers may be used in space to intercept ballistic missiles.

Both writers acknowledge that these reports read like science fiction; and in fact, they are. Military optimism is based on the fact that the laser has two important advantages over an ordinary light source, such as a tungsten lamp. First, the laser emits an intense beam of light of a single wavelength; second, the waves do not spread out but remain in a narrow beam for distances up to thousands of miles. At very short range (a few feet), laser beams focused through lenses can concentrate enough energy on a tiny area to burn a microscopic hole in a thin piece of metal, such as a razor blade.

Research on lasers for military use is part of Project Defender, sponsored by the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency. A manned anti-missile satellite is already under development by the Martin Company and several subcontractors. Their goal is to produce a 15-ton vehicle containing a nuclear reactor and some other power source, which can generate a continuous laser beam with a temperature of about one million degrees. A radar system in the satellite would detect an enemy missile as it rises above the atmosphere; another radar would focus the laser beam on it and disintegrate it. A more complex project calls for developing a ground-based anti-missile laser.

Physicists not employed by the Defense Department or its contractors take a pessimistic view of such projects. Present lasers are spectacularly inefficient; they emit only one or two percent of the energy pumped into them. Moreover, they cannot handle the enormous power required to generate a missile-vaporizing beam, and experts believe that no foreseeable improvement will remedy this. A group of consulting scientists and engineers, Maser-Laser Associates of Cambridge, Massachusetts, reported that "Important advances and breakdowns are required before they [laser weapons] can be realistically considered," and that the laser death-ray "is certainly not within the development capability of known technology."

Considering the characteristic caution of scientists, these are strong words. Their significance can perhaps be better understood by recalling that several other projects that have recently proved unfeasible, notably Skybolt, Midas and the B-70, *do* lie within the development capability of known technology. This is not to say that laser weapons are impossible; but the technical

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odds against their development are great. It would be well for the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations to keep this point in mind when it considers the 1964 budget for Project Defender.

WILLIAM E. BOGGS

Disestablishmentarianism

If a strategically-placed minority in the US Senate can delay or derail the President's key legislative projects (and no one doubts it), is the answer another palace revolution along the lines of the 1913 revolt by Senate progressives, to which TRB points admiringly in this issue? Even if that were feasible (and who considers it so?), would liberals have more to gain than to lose by junking the seniority system now and packing the Senate's committees to their own taste? And if more to gain today, what of tomorrow and the next day?

Before tackling these posers, let's examine Senator Clark's own remarkable rise in seniority, putting him ahead of 32 other Democrats after only six years in office. The explanation is obvious, of course; deaths, retirements, and a net gain of 18 Democratic seats since 1957 – plus his own hard-fought re-election last year – have served to push the Senator half-way up a longer ladder. Not so obvious is what these changes have wrought in the composition of the entire Senate Democratic majority. Consider these facts:

– The majority now consists of 23 Senators from the South, 17 from the West, 15 from the Midwest, and 12 from the East. But – 22 of the Southerners entered the Senate before mid-1958 while nine of the Westerners, nine of the Midwesterners, and ten of the Easterners entered after the 1958 election.

– Six incumbent Senators, ranging in age from 63 to 74, died during the course of the 87th Congress. Their average age was 67. Of the 17 incumbent Democrats now 65 or over, 10 are Southerners. Of the 36 now 55 or more, 19 are Southerners. Conversely, of the 31 Democrats under 55, only four are Southerners.

– In the event of any Senate vacancies prior to the 1964 election, the current lineup of Governors renders the odds better than 2-to-1 that a Democrat would be named to replace a Democrat and about 3-to-2 that a Democrat would take the place of a Republican. These odds climb to 3-to-1 and 2-to-1, respectively, for incumbents 65 and over.

While of no immediate import to the Senate "Establishment" as now constituted, the lopsided age-tenure structure of the majority could lead to some novel developments rather soon.

Next year, for example, 25 Democratic Senators come up for re-election, only six of whom are Southerners. Excepting the 37-year-old Senator Edmondson, appointed to Senator Kerr's seat, the other five Southerners average 64 years of age. By contrast, the 19 non-Southerners average 50. Moreover, only two of these 19 won in 1958 or later by majorities smaller than those given President Kennedy in the same states in 1960. Of those dozen members in the Class of '58 – a feast year for Democrats – some are in trouble, no doubt. But to assume heavy casualties among the 19 non-Southerners is to assume that the re-election of President Kennedy – and by larger margins than he won in 1960 – is improbable.

When the next mid-term election rolls around in 1966, 10 of the 20 Democratic seats at stake will be those of Southerners whose average age today is 62. The 10 non-Southerners, now averaging 57, include no more than three whose seats are clearly marginal. Of the nine elected along with the President in 1960, moreover, all won by wider margins than his.

In sum, despite the prospect of some net losses among non-Southern Democrats over the next two elections, the present age-tenure composition of the Senate majority points to an inevitable shift in the pattern of seniority, with non-Southerners rising to the ranks now occupied by Southerners. Although there is no direct correlation between the coming decline in Southern seniority and a rise of liberal influence upon the "Establishment," there is enough to suggest that disestablishmentarianism may be a rather short-sighted objective for liberals.

Senator Clark himself has noted that since 1958 "the attrition in the Establishment has been very substantial indeed," and has acknowledged the obvious fact that liberals now control at least six of the Senate's 13 major committees – Banking, Commerce, Government Operations, Interior, Labor and Public Works. If the Finance and Appropriations Committees are beyond grasp at the moment, their actions remain as always subject to check on the Senate floor.

All this will not speed favorable consideration of the President's tax bill or health care proposals, and upon the enactment of such measures may rest the Democratic Party's best chances for an assured victory in 1964. Yet viewed in the longer perspective, the mathematics of the situation suggests the possibility of fruitful negotiations between the liberals and the "Establishment." Those Southern Democrats who would prolong their states' influence in the Senate might welcome promises of future consideration in return for current favors, for a liberal-dominated "Establishment" (and the concept is not so wild) could deal with *its* foes in a most ruthless fashion. Both sides might even begin to perceive their common interest in legislative reform as a means to restoring Congress to a more nearly co-equal role in the formulation of national policy.

WILLIAM A. KORNS

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Landmark in Labor Relations

Until recently, unions whose members were most affected by rapid technological progress made the control of innovations a major bargaining issue, but in a way galling to management and the public; they pushed hard for featherbedding arrangements – that unnecessary extra engineer on the train or a full contingent of stage hands for a two-character drama. No other plan for handling technological advance was offered.

The Kaiser-United Steelworkers agreement which went into effect March 1 is a remarkable departure from these simple-minded attempts to "spread the work." Several innovations are contained in the new agreement. For workers who become technologically unemployed there will be a company reserve employment pool to which they may go. While in this haven, they will receive pay, retraining when required, and a reasonable opportunity to return to regular work at a similar or better job grade. Employees in the reserve will be available to work on short-term tasks for the company, however. If their pay when returning to the regular work force is lower than their previous graded pay, a differential or subsidy will be added to make up the difference. The advantages over featherbedding and other work-spreading devices are obvious: managers can introduce new cost-reducing machines and methods more readily; workers in the reserve pool will consider their status as temporary; and they will be available for work, unlike the many unionists in numerous industries who are paid to sit quietly, doing nothing.



"It's only feathers."

Another innovation is a plan to share the gains from productivity increases on a pay-as-you-go basis. Each month productivity will be measured. Savings which result from increased productivity will be shared, 32.5 percent of the savings going to the workers. This figure of 32.5 percent has been the portion of labor costs in total manufacturing costs at Kaiser for years. Thus, a prime source of labor-management strife – quarreling every year or two over who or what contributed more to a rise in productivity, whether workers, machines, or managers – is ended (though the ease with which the formula was devised at Kaiser may not reflect complexities in other industries).

The Kaiser agreement is not, of course, a universal remedy for automation. It carries with it the probability that workers will become tied more tightly to the firm which presently employs them. With widespread use of the reserve pool provision, labor will become even less mobile than it is now. From the national or public point of view, this could be unfortunate. We might call it the "closed society" approach, and wonder if we were not regressing toward a guild-like, company-oriented labor movement. Should the Kaiser formula spread, either some government countermeasures ought to be offered, such as tax exemptions for moving costs of laborers, or these agreements ought to include some transferability of benefits among firms.

As for sharing productivity gains by a formula based on the recent portion of labor costs in total manufacturing costs, it is all to the good. For it has always been extremely difficult to calculate a just return to labor. If total production goes up in any one year, and the labor force remains the same size, does that mean all the gain should go to labor, as some union officials have said? If the arithmetic had been done differently, dividing production by capital invested, it might appear that all of the gain should go to capital – and so management has argued.

The Kaiser approach to this problem is especially attractive from the public point of view, because it will tend to keep wages in line with productivity increases and also with fair increases in profits, which are needed to maintain investment incentives. It is likewise non-inflationary and in line with the philosophy of the sensible but controversial productivity guidelines set by the Council of Economic Advisers in 1962 and 1963.

The Supreme Court's recent decision allowing the railroads to modernize should force unions in all industries to do some rethinking on featherbedding and automation. The Kaiser agreement would be a good starting point.

Harald Malmgren

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NOT THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY, NOT THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW

Placing General de Gaulle

Paris

American journalists and news commentators have been tireless in their speculations over the past several weeks as to whether General de Gaulle is a figure from the past or a thinker ahead of his times. Is he, as his opponents would have it, a captive of anachronistic concepts: power, grandeur, national sovereignty? Or, as his admirers proclaim, has he once again looked beyond the mists of the present and discerned the shape of things to come, thus risking the incredulity of minds less clear-thinking and more conventional than his?

I shall chance criticism from both sides by rejecting out of hand both the man-of-the-past and the prophet-of-the-future interpretations. Aside from his method of approach – and certainly after 22 years of dealing with de Gaulle our partners should be used to his way of approaching issues – it seems clear to me that de Gaulle turned down Britain's admission into the Common Market in terms simply of his concept of France's national interests.

Unquestionably, this concept of national interest bears the hallmark of tradition. Does this mean that it is outmoded? I wish it were, but I am not convinced that it is. Was not Great Britain too acting in accordance with what she deemed her national interests when she refused to join the Coal and Steel Community in 1950 and to take part in the Treaty of Rome in 1957-58? And when she proposed a vast free-trade zone and actually founded the smaller trade zone of the Outer Seven? None of the British ministers with whom I discussed these matters in October-November of 1961 explained Britain's desire to join the Common Market *primarily* in terms of the interests of Europe or of the West. All of them – the enthusiastic protagonists, those resigned to the idea, and those hostile to it – discussed the advantages and disadvantages they anticipated or feared in terms of the British economy, not without invoking the concept of reinforcing Europe or the West, but certainly without giving this concept first place in their arguments pro and con.

I do not wish to imply that our friends from across the Channel are more national-minded or more nationalistic than the European countries, or that they would not be as good Europeans as the latter after being admitted to the Common Market. The concept of the "French national interest" is lent anachronistic overtones by the pen of commentators who dub it part of a "grand design," an effort at "domination of Europe" or simply "chauvinism." Yet these labels do not apply either to management in France as a whole (which fears British participation), or to the partisans of a smaller Europe who cling stubbornly to the ideal of continental integration (an ideal which as recently as two years ago was shared by both the American administration and the "European party" on the continent). There is nothing to prove that these descriptive terms, either grandiose or disparaging, apply to de Gaulle's motives, for on this subject the French chief of state has been neither equivocal nor enigmatic: he frankly prefers the Europe of the Six to a Europe of the Seven (or Nine) because he believes the former is more in conformity with French and European economic and political interests. In his eyes a Europe of the Seven or of the Nine would dissolve into an Atlantic zone under "American domination," for General de Gaulle considers President Kennedy as the guardian of America's national interests in the same way that he, de Gaulle, is the custodian of French national interests.

As interpreted at the Elysée Palace, Kennedy's speech on interdependence and the Trade Expansion Act increased the concern aroused by Britain's candidacy. In Washington, on the other hand, the speech and the Act were interpreted as a consecration of Old Europe's re-establishment on terms of equal partnership with the New World.

General de Gaulle did not, it is true, justify his decision to exclude Britain solely on the basis of French national interests, or even exclusively on Europe's interests. He placed his thought and action within a vaster framework of an historical philosophy. In its essentials this philosophy was outlined in the third volume of his *Memoirs*. With an impertinence shocking to some readers, I have refused to grant that this philosophy has any uncommon prophetic value.

My colleague Walter Lippmann, after a year of passionate anti-Gaullism, has returned to a better attitude and now interprets General de Gaulle's "no" as an act symbolizing a Europe reborn and shaking itself free of the paternal and protective yoke of its great American ties. The postwar period is over and done with, the Cold War has come to an end. Once again it is the President of the French Republic who feels the urgency of the future.

This is not the first time since 1945 that Lippmann has believed the Cold War was being terminated. The economic recovery of Europe is an undeniable fact: partisans and opponents of British participation in the

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Common Market are alike attempting to reap the results of this recovery and establish trans-Atlantic relations on new bases. But Europe's military weakness is as irrefutable as its economic strength. The Belgians, the Dutch, the Italians, and even more the Germans, including Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, all realize as clearly today as yesterday that their security depends not only on the thermonuclear strength of the United States, but also on the presence of several hundred thousand American soldiers on soil of the Old Continent. Only this fact gives adequate "plausibility" to America's commitment to defend Europe.

No one imagines that the French striking force composed of 50 supersonic fighter-bombers can over the next few years come to equal for all Europe the value of America's striking force. Even if French Mirage IV's, in the opinion of French aviators and some American ones, are capable of getting through Soviet defenses and escaping the onslaught of Russia's surface-to-air-missiles, they will still be a supplement to rather than a substitute for America's dissuasive force. None of our partners in the Six envisages, for the foreseeable future, the possibility of relying on the French rather than the American force. If it does not seem possible to solve the problem of whose finger shall control the trigger within the framework of a multilateral NATO force, a solution does not appear any more feasible within a European framework. As to choosing a foreign finger, I wonder if the Europeans, without exception, would not still prefer American control to any other. In any case I am convinced that the British, the Italians and the Germans would prefer an American to a French finger. As to General de Gaulle, he has said again and again that the French striking force would always be under the orders of a French leader, and only a French leader – a traditional concept which, whether one deplores it or not, is not necessarily an anachronism.

I have so far said nothing about still another interpretation: that of Joseph Alsop, who carries admiration of General de Gaulle to such lengths as to attribute to him the goal of ridding Europe of American troops. He even reproaches the Kennedy team for not believing, because it would be unreasonable, that this *is* the Gaullist scheme. Mr. Alsop should consider the facts: on this point most French, whether for or against de Gaulle, agree with the conviction of the Kennedy team. Not all French have the same feelings about their President but, as General de Gaulle himself once said, no one has ever considered him unintelligent. And today one would have to be unintelligent to seek the departure of the American troops.

Raymond Aron

FIVE MEN TO A SAFETY CATCH, THREE TO A TRIGGER?

Merchant of Nassau

London

Mr. Livingstone Merchant's tour of the European capitals to discuss the creation of a multilateral NATO deterrent has brought the central problem of the Western Alliance into the forefront of political argument: how is it possible to organize collective control of the power of life and death when each ally wants to possess both its trigger and its safety catch? Mr. Merchant's task was made more difficult by the warning Congress gave him before he left – that it would not amend the McMahon Act so as to permit America's atomic weapons to pass out of America's control.

Thus the only proposals he is permitted to make for a collective deterrent involve the United States' having the right to veto its use – either through its membership of any qualified majority or through the adoption of the unanimity rule. From every point of view, such a NATO deterrent force would be worse than useless. It would add nothing of value to the deterrent forces maintained by the US on her own, which are already more than adequate for any conceivable purpose. It would even further emphasize the inequality of the European allies, whose nuclear forces would be subject to American veto while America remained free to use her own independently. At the same time the ability of the European allies to contribute adequately to the conventional forces of the alliance would be substantially reduced by the enormous cost of their new strategic nuclear force.

In view of the probability that the Europeans will reject such a proposal out of hand, there has been some talk of allowing them all the same right as was implied for Britain by the Nassau Agreement – to withdraw their part of the force from collective control in a crisis when they felt their vital national interests were direct-

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A Workable Deterrent

There is no sign that the creation of a multilateral force, whether a NATO force or a European force, is of any interest to General de Gaulle, or that it will have any effect on the development of a French independent nuclear force. Moreover, there is yet to be developed any plan which would suggest how a NATO multilateral force might be used, or how, as Mr. Healey notes, we solve the problem of "15 fingers on the trigger and 15 fingers on the safety latch" problem. But so long as the US Government believes that ultimately somebody will hit upon a workable plan for multilateral force which will bring to an end the drive for independent nuclear deterrents in Europe, Washington will not face squarely the real problems of European defense and seek a genuine solution.

By a "genuine solution," we mean one which concentrates on developing an acceptable strategy for the NATO Alliance as a whole and which takes into account the political and military needs of the European allies. Such a strategy must rest on the bedrock of a substantial increase in NATO's conventional power so that it could counter any conventional threat without resort to nuclear weapons. This is more than the concept of a "pause." Secretary of Defense McNamara came as far as any US official has ever come publicly in endorsing such a position when he told the House Armed Services Committee last month that the "decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other way to cope with the particular situation. The NATO powers have all the resources, the talents and the skills needed to match our opponent at any level of effort in Europe." But this policy needs to be spelled out in less ambiguous terms: conventional defense is the goal of American policy. An attempt must be made to persuade the new group of leaders in Germany, in particular the new Defense Minister von Hassel, that such a strategy is not only in the interest of the US and the NATO Alliance as a whole but also in the interest of Germany.

For all the talk about multilateral deterrents, all the US can reasonably hope to do in the immediate future is, first, to convince the Europeans that national or even multilateral nuclear capabilities are not a substitute for conventional forces. Second, Washington can be much more candid than it has been in sharing information about its nuclear capability and about the target system US nuclear forces would use in an event of a nuclear war, so that the Europeans can be sure that the targets of interest to them are being covered by American strategic forces.

THE EDITORS

ly affected. But, apart from the difficulty of persuading Congress to permit such a change in American policy, if such a right were to be more than a meaningless sop to European opinion it would be tantamount to giving the European countries separate independent national deterrents. Though some of America's allies might welcome such an opportunity to achieve atomic independence by the back door, the alliance as a whole would much prefer the status quo, and the Soviet Union has already warned that it would react vigorously against any step which would give atomic weapons to Dr. Adenauer's Government.

At first sight there might be more to be said for a collective European deterrent inside NATO which operated by some sort of majority rule without an American veto. But in practice there is no reason to believe that the Europeans would find it easier to agree among themselves on the control of such a deterrent than to agree with the United States. In fact, they probably trust one another in this field far less than they trust the United States.

Perhaps the most interesting proposal for solving the control problem has been made by Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton University. He suggests that in carefully defined situations of crisis the decision to use the force should be vested in the heads of the government of the US, Britain, France, Western Germany, and Italy, and that any three of these should be able to authorize its use, while members of the alliance which so desired – including if necessary the remaining two of the Big Five – should be allowed to opt out of the action which followed. In my view this ingenious suggestion grossly underestimates the divisive consequences of organizing a system which would permit allies to opt out of collective responsibility in a crisis; furthermore, the cost of providing a force which would be credible as a deterrent if for example only France, Germany, and Italy participated in its use would rule out any possibility of maintaining the vital conventional forces NATO would need in any case.

There is something to be said for getting the European countries to discuss the general problem of nuclear weapons control, if only to teach them to look more realistically at the cost and complexity of a credible national deterrent.

But it looks as if panic at the revelation of General de Gaulle's long-term aims in Europe may have provoked Washington into raising the matter in the wrong way at the wrong time. The dog was drowsy, if, indeed, not actually asleep, and Mr. Merchant's journey may have roused it unnecessarily into a bad temper.

DENIS HEALEY

DENIS HEALEY, a frequent contributor to these pages, has just been designated the Labour Party's spokesman on Defense in Parliament.

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MALAYSIA

A "Game of Footsy" in Southeast Asia

by Denis Warner

A new crisis has engulfed Southeast Asia. Late in January, both President Sukarno and his Defense Minister, General Nasution, who has long been regarded by many Westerners as the most responsible of the Indonesian leaders, advised American officials in Djakarta that they favored using their considerable military forces to seize the three British Borneo territories, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Indonesia laid no claim to these territories, they insisted. They were not interested in territorial conquest but in protecting Indonesia's flanks. Having claimed – and won – possession of West New Guinea and its Papuan inhabitants on the grounds that they constituted part of the former territories and population of the Netherlands East Indies, the Indonesian leaders knew that their consistency and good faith, would be called into immediate question if they laid claim to those parts of Borneo over which the Dutch had not exercised control.

Their justification for this contemplated act of aggression was much more sophisticated. For American ears, they professed grave fear of Communist China and expressed the opinion that the Malaysian Federation, which is due to come into being August 31, and to embrace Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo territories, would prove in the long run the thin end of the Chinese Communist wedge and directly endanger the security of Indonesia. They argued that there was demonstrable opposition to Malaysia not only in the Borneo territories but also in Singapore and Malaya; that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist concept of Tenku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Prime Minister, who had been consistently hostile to Indonesia's present leaders, even to the point of openly helping the ill-fated Sumatran revolt in 1958; and that anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist Indonesia had a duty to assist all anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in neighboring countries, including Borneo and Timor, where the Portuguese maintain a precarious colonial foothold. News of the Indonesian intention, though implicit for some time in veiled threats, sent the Malayans to action stations and the British, who have defense obligations both in Malaya and Borneo, into a series of military moves and urgent official consultations with Australia, next to Malaya their most immediately concerned Commonwealth partner.

With the US about to enter into a new and desperately needed, economic aid program to Indonesia, Washington was in position to apply the brakes. To the extent that an early Indonesian invasion of the Borneo territories appears to have been postponed, this pressure was successful, though there was little comfort to be had from Djkarta's assurances that there would be no overt attack provided the British remained: the British are committed to go. Nor were the prospects for lasting peace in the region enhanced by the active participation of the Philippines, which revived an old claim to North Borneo. Early suggestions that the Philippines were more interested in a cash settlement than in the acquisition of territory have been shaken by their hardening line, and remarkably, by Manila's cultivation of a new, close relationship with Djkarta at the cost of its hitherto friendly association with Kuala Lumpur in the Association of Southeast Asia, which is composed of Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines.

In what one Washington official privately described as a "game of footsy," the Philippines and Indonesia combined to heighten the tension. On February 1 Major-General Jani, the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, said the army was "awaiting the order" to move in support of people "struggling for independence" in British Borneo. This followed an earlier statement from Manila that the Philippines and Indonesia would combine patrols in the Celebes Sea and the waters in the southern Philippines, adjoining British Borneo. The British moved their small strategic reserve in Southeast Asia into Brunei and flew reinforcements from London to Malaya; the Malayan Navy announced that it would "step-up" patrols to "counter violations by Indonesian gunboats," which, in response to what Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, calls a "policy of confrontation," had been making a show of force beyond, and sometimes within, Malayan waters.

Much of this has escaped attention in the world's press, which is possibly unaware of the implications of

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DENIS WARNER, *an Australian writer who travels extensively in Southeast Asia, wrote "Experiment in Neutrality" in the February 2 issue of this journal.*

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a Malaysian shooting war. British involvement over Malaya and Malaysia would also involve Australia and New Zealand, which station forces in Malaya and share in Britain's defense responsibilities. And since both Australia and New Zealand (though not Britain) are members of the little-known ANZUS treaty organization, the United States would also become involved if the shooting spread across the borders of New Guinea into Australian territory.

Both the Soviet Union, which has contributed some $700 million toward the considerable Indonesian military build-up (one heavy cruiser with another on the way; destroyers; submarines; jet bombers and fighters and an array of air-to-ground, air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles), and Communist China have stated their support for this "struggle against imperialism," which, in Peking's case is a wry piece of expediency since it ignores Djkarta's scarcely secret claims that it is against Malaysia because it will become a means of Chinese expansion. Thus, what began as a seemingly desirable merging of the former British colonial territories in Southeast Asia, with high promise that the new Federation would help to bring stability and progress to a notoriously unstable region, is now rapidly becoming filled with the gravest danger not only for Southeast Asia but for all countries with a vested interest in its future and they are many.

Though there are shades of gravity, solutions appear unlikely. If US pressures produce permanent second thoughts about the desirability of using overt force, the Indonesians can always fall back on the safer and tested expediency of calling its troops "volunteers." Britain cannot with grace back down at this stage, especially since Tenku Abdul Rahman has sworn that Malaysia will go through on August 31 and hang the consequences. Though the Secretary-General of the United Nations has started the wheels turning for a diplomatic settlement, Malaya's position is that it has nothing to negotiate, least of all with Indonesia.

Even under the most favorable circumstances and without the external threats and pressures that have developed, Malaysia would not have begun life very comfortably. The Borneo territories tended to see themselves as the country cousins in the union and generally would have preferred a better prepared, step-by-step advance into self-government and independence. The winds of change had not penetrated very deeply into the Borneo jungles. Political consciousness was only just beginning, and many felt that the development of full self-government and the union of the Borneo territories should have preceded serious consideration of Malaysia. There was a good deal of justified suspicion that Tenku Abdul Rahman had conceived the idea as the one practicable solution to the problem of merging predominantly Chinese and over-populated Singapore with predominantly Malay, and not excessively populated, Malaya. Singapore is to Malaya what New York is to the United States, but to have accommodated the two alone under the one federal roof would have given the harder-working, economically-dominant Chinese a population edge that they would have inevitably turned to political advantage. This may prove true, also, of Malaysia, but the risks are more widely spread and the Malay and Chinese ingredients diluted by numerous other races. Though slightly more than four million Malaysian Chinese will outnumber slightly less than four million Malaysian Malays, the new Federation, if it comes into being, will also number among its 10 million people a million Indians and Pakistanis, a quarter of a million Sea Dayaks, 145,000 Dusuns, 61,000 Bajaus, 58,000 Land Dayaks and a score of other races. At least the chances were that Singapore, despite its potentially explosive and Communist-tinged Chinese population, would have fitted reasonably well into Malaysia: left to its own devices, and spurned by Malaya, Singapore could scarcely fail to become an outpost of Peking in Southeast Asia.

It is also true that indigenous opposition to Malaysia has been in inverse proportion to Indonesian interest in upsetting it. Pro-Communist Chinese groups in Singapore and Sarawak, which, with a population of about 750,000, is the most populous of the Borneo territories, continue to oppose Malaysia. The scattering of the rebels in Brunei (population 85,000) after the anti-Malaysian uprising last December and the dissolution of the Party Ra'ayat, which held all the elective seats, has not ended opposition to Malaysia here: but the much larger political majorities in Sarawak, North Borneo (population 460,000), Malaya (population 7 million) and, though less certainly, in Singapore (population 1.7 million) are in favor. Asked to choose between the "imperialism" of Rahman's Kuala Lumpur and the "imperialism" of Sukarno's Indonesia, most incipient Malaysians, including the Chinese, have little difficulty in deciding in Malaya's favor.

To Westerners preoccupied with containing Communism in Southeast Asia, the undeclared war over Malaysia offers only unacceptable alternatives. A thwarted Sukarno will turn more and more to the Communist bloc for support: and Indonesia with a population of nearly 100 million and ranking third to the United States and the Soviet Union in known natural resources is the richest of all Southeast Asian prizes. Yet to concede to Indonesia's armed demands, it is daily becoming clearer, is merely to whet its appetite. Borneo has only temporarily diverted Indonesian attention from Portuguese Timor; and the Australians have begun to come in for criticism in eastern New Guinea. The Russians, it is sometimes said, hope to make Java the Cuba of Southeast Asia. The analogy is not quite exact, but, whatever their game, they are doing very nicely at the moment.

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Impurities in Yorkville

With Pornography, One Thing Leads to Another

by Murray Kempton

The saddest things in Manhattan are the isolated banners of the people who hold out against it – Calvary Church on 57th Street where the river Baptists keep their rites intact just across the street from the dirty foreign film houses; or the stores in Harlem that advertise hog's maw. They remind us how many New Yorkers came from somewhere else and how dearly they wish they hadn't.

The largest banner of all is Yorkville, which in theory embraces all of Manhattan's East Side from 59th Street to 96th Street, where runs the Wall of Spanish Harlem. The Upper East Side contains, of course, whatever Manhattan can still claim of elegance; Yorkville's St. Ignatius Loyola must be the only Catholic Church on the island whose rector keeps the New York Social Register in his study. But what is unique in Yorkville is not its upper but its middle class.

Nowhere else in Manhattan can that middle class be found not transient but permanent, not mixed among the poor but separated and intact. Its streets are nearly clean; its faces almost all white. Columbus Avenue is like parts of San Juan; 125th Street is Birmingham decaying toward Johannesburg; Yorkville is White Plains. There are San Juans and Birminghams all over Manhattan; but Yorkville is the only White Plains.

And so New York has no neighborhood left except Yorkville where a campaign against pornography could be mounted. Campaigns against pornography are suburban by their first premise, which is that evil comes from the outside and that walls can be built against it. Yorkville has barely a blade of grass; but its heart is still suburban.

The presence of alien evil first struck Yorkville at St. Ignatius when a parochial school teacher found a dirty bubble gum card in a pupil's desk.

"A *dirty* bubble gum card?" a visitor asks a mother.

"A pin-up bubble gum card," the mother answers. "And who buys bubble gum? You? Me? No, only children."

The devil comes to us first disguised as the Spirit of Scientific Inquiry: "You have it, of course?"

"Have it? Of course not. The sister wouldn't touch it."

The mothers of Saint Ignatius thereupon organized and conscripted the fathers who went about in teams to check the neighborhood stores. "We told them," a directress avenging angel said, "just to look for books they wouldn't want their children to read."

"There are 55 stores in Yorkville. Thirty-nine are selling some kind of pornography – 22 hard core and 17 objectionable."

When the fathers came back, some of the mothers decided they should go and look for themselves. We are a matriarchal society.

"We had a long talk with a gentleman on First Avenue," the angel avengtrix reported, in an indication of how much better women are at these missions than men. "We pretended we were interested in buying more. We told him we wanted some particularly bad magazines. He promised to get them for us. He especially stated that he sold them to children. He did it because there was money in them, he said."

"We also went into the supermarkets and the five and tens," she went on. "The five and tens have some of the worst." The woman held up a paperback called *Pornography and the Law*. "This was sold next to a toy counter."

St. Ignatius enlisted a Rabbi and a Lutheran pastor and the Yorkville Chamber of Commerce ("We're 100 percent behind you in protecting the youth from sillichous literature.") and formed Operation Yorkville, their campaign instrument. But its soul is still St. Ignatius and its leader is Father Morton Hill, S.J.

"In Russia," says Father Hill, "there is a five-year jail term for anyone caught distributing pornography. That's what they think of their children."

Part of Father Hill's mission is to awaken Yorkville; another part is to arouse the sleeping guardians of the law. He travels about the neighborhood churches with two movies, one produced by the Third Order of Saint Francis, the other by the Citizens for Decent Literature, both church auxiliaries.

The CDL film is the more compelling; it is a lecture with exhibits: See the dog in the picture; that is bestiality. See those buttocks: that's for the sodomist. See the muscle ad; it has been proven that prolonged exposure to this sort of thing prevents the development of a boy's healthy interest in girls. See the high boots; they

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are to lure your daughters into Lesbianism.

Father Hill brings this strange terrible world home to Yorkville by reminding the audience that the sisters have discovered a Playboy Club in the fifth grade at one of the schools; its members chip in a dime each to buy a monthly share in that bible of the sophisticated adult male.

Father Hill's chief printed instrument is "Let's Wipe out the Schoolyard Sex Racket," an epistle by J. Edgar Hoover on the letterhead of the Department of Justice. The power of this imprimatur brought Special FBI Agent John J. Malone to an Operation Abolition meeting and he is quoted in one of its reports as urging those present " 'to complain vigorously to all adults involved' in the distribution of salacious literature."

"Did I say that?" Malone wondered later, plainly troubled at the thought that he might have incited to vigilantism. "Oh, of course, I did. I was very careful just to limit myself to quoting the director; those are his words."

Father Hill is passionate where Special Agent Malone is only dutiful; the difference in key describes Father Hill's problem with those law enforcement agents who are a special object of his mission.

"There are hundreds of New York City policemen who deal full-time with narcotics and no one who deals full-time with pornography," he says. "We're only waiting for them to tell us what can be done." To Father Hill, the dirty book is a menace as direct and real in its effects as heroin. In the same tenor, he has asked the Poison Control Center of the Department of Health to label pornography a danger as noxious as cyanide; he wants the Department of Sanitation to conduct public burnings. His visits to these bureaucrats bring him home anointed with vague politeness and no satisfaction at all.

Priests and Cops

To the bureaucrats, Father Hill must be that object so foreign to Manhattan, the priest who is a Puritan. Anyone who makes any effort to find out the truth about New York decides very soon that he can expect only ignorant innocence from liberals and must go for sophisticated realism to priests and cops.

Lieutenant John Sullivan, of the New York City Police Department's Legal Bureau and the cop most directly engaged in Father Hill's field of action, turns out as an instance to be a model of the adult attitude toward pornography. (The adult attitude toward pornography is, of course, a matter of intensely personal definition. My own attitude was best stated by Evelyn Waugh who says he hopes the Church abandons the Index although he will certainly miss the excuse not to read Sartre. I did not read *The Naked Lunch* while it was underground, out of a certain reactionary instinct that persons who read books mainly because they are suppressed get pretty much the books they deserve. I am grateful to the Post Office Department for releasing it now, although I am certainly not grateful for the occasion this action provided for reading a chunk of it. In fairness, it should be said that Lieutenant Sullivan, a policemen, is more open-spirited than I; he found *Lady Chatterly's Lover* a beautiful book where I can only find Lawrence a beautiful man.)

These days no subject produces delicacies so infinite as obscenity does when it comes into court; Lieutenant Sullivan's work is a process of refined consideration of just how much it will take to disgust a judge. He is a familiar of the works of I. Beatem, Tiny Heel, Harold Switch and other inglorious Miltons of the whip, chain and jackboot *genre;* judges will occasionally draw the line at sadists, masochists and hair fetishists when they get too exotic. Sullivan also hopes to try a booklet called "Russian Stud," which is rather ungrateful of him, since it details the adventures of a sexual acrobat planted here by Khrushchev to destroy the health of American women and is thus pornography's single positive contribution to the Resistance.

Sullivan works without pleasure in reaches which can barely be described as sexual; the magazines which affront Father Hill seem almost healthy by comparison. When Sullivan saw Father Hill's movie, he had as a realist to point out that there was not one exhibit there that was obscene according to law.

Dr. Oscar Diamond, director of the Manhattan State Hospital (for the criminally disturbed) is Father Hill's closest grasp at an official sympathizer and he shows up at occasional screenings as an expert witness.

He improvises from some magazines purchased in Yorkville:

"Notice these are action photographs. These are more to the interests of adolescents. They want movement, they want action. Notice, none of the girls is fully unclothed; but everyone in a provocative pose, dressing or undressing. See the keyhole; that's for voyeurs. The buttocks is the sodomy bit. The youngsters get hooked; they want more. Then there are the perversion magazines – homos, masochism, all the isms, which are the vile stuff. One thing leads to another, and they get a foot in the door."

Dr. Diamond was performing this ballet in the parish house of St. Thomas More. It is, of course, never easy to talk about sex, even for people's good, without sounding vulgar; and Dr. Diamond's high purpose could not quite elevate his tone above that of the candy butcher. But it could not be imagined that there were any secret places where the audience could be enjoying such things.

They are only horrible. There was a time when, to the ordinary American, morality was a matter of protecting little girls from little boys. But now horrid

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worms wriggle before us: dogs, goats, whips, chains; after such things, one could conceive a mother rising to wish for her daughter only the simple comfort of what used to be called a fate worse than death.

The nature of their material may explain why Father Hill's seances seem to leave the participants with so little fire. The true passion of any anti-sex crusade probably depends to some obscure degree on the sexual drive of its votaries. After all, sex can excite; this stuff merely disgusts.

Operation Yorkville's action meeting of community leaders a week ago Monday drew a smaller attendance than expected; there were few testaments from the floor; the motor was visibly running down. After six months, the Operation still had no program; it was a long step from inspecting the supermarkets to policing them; no one dared suggest it; even Yorkville fears the Liberal Censor.

The only practical action was a telegram to President Kennedy entreating his concern and praying his assistance; the President worships at St. Ignatius when he is in New York; Yorkville thinks of him then as one last rope of power. It is not a rope with a sure connection at the other end. The President, after all, has made two authors popular in the United States; and, if one was Robert Frost, the other is Ian Fleming. Could an Operation Yorkville mother trust a James Bond-addicted father to inspect *her* supermarket?

The New Court

by Alexander M. Bickel

For nearly a generation, the Justices of the Supreme Court have been closely divided over questions of the powers of the political branches of government and the limitation on those powers. These questions have highlighted profoundly different conceptions of the role to be assigned to a written constitution and to the Justices as its spokesmen in a democratic society. Now there are not only two new Justices, but the institution has lost the weight and the voice of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Neither its unities nor its divisions can now be the same. There *is* a new Court. It will be some time before it quite finds itself, but for the first time, in the Citizenship Cases decided on February 18, it manifested a new self in a significant context.

The issue in these cases is left over from one of those resounding philosophical clashes of the Fifties. May the government, on various grounds, deprive native-born Americans of their citizenship? No, never, said Justices Black and Douglas; there is no such power in the federal government. Yes, as an exercise of a power to regulate the tenure of citizenship and in aid of such national functions as war and foreign relations, said Justice Frankfurter. Citizenship may be taken away, the Court held, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black and others dissenting, for voting in a foreign political election. It may not be taken away, the Court held, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and others dissenting, for committing a rather technically defined offense of desertion from the armed services. The question left over was whether citizenship could be taken away for fleeing the country in wartime for the express purpose of evading the draft. Dividing 5-4, but on novel and narrower grounds, the Court in these cases held that it cannot.

The dissenters were Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White, and there is some confirmation here of what one or two earlier cases have seemed to indicate, namely that Justice White may tend toward the Frankfurter pole; though this is not to say that his matured position can as yet be predicted or that he will arrive where he does after any fashion but his own. But the great interest of these cases lies in the opinion of the majority, written by Justice Goldberg for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan.

The general approach of this opinion, the mood in which it attacks its problem, will, if sustained, have far-reaching consequences for the Court. The approach is to adjourn the apocalyptic debate to whose continual resumption we had become accustomed; it is to seek a mediating way between the ultimates of judicial assertion or denial of governmental power. There is significance in the fact that the new Justice Goldberg took this approach. It is even more significant that he was joined by Justice Black – the Great Thunderer himself, one may say, meaning no disrespect – and by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas. This is an opinion in which the philosophical clash of old is present, but as the sound of a distant battle. The path of decision leads away from the battle. And what is offered in the end is, to be sure, not a resolution of the conflict, but a moment of respite. It is altogether, in the intent and in

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the execution, a most skillful performance, the prototype – may one hope? – of others to come. For the Court needs some respite, and so does the country. Nobody should wish to take mind out of the Supreme Court, as Namier was accused of taking it out of history. But there can be too much of stark ideological struggle, too much forcing of choices between mutually exclusive ideological ultimates, especially with respect to problems to which no satisfactory choice between such ultimates seems possible.

Such a problem is the power of government – or the lack of it – to denationalize natural-born citizens who commit acts that may be thought to be in contravention of the duties of citizenship. The issue turns initially on whether denationalization is a punishment. If it is, in the same sense in which a fine, imprisonment, or deprivation of civil rights for the commission of a crime is a punishment, then the Constitution commands that it may not be imposed without a jury trial and other safeguards applicable to the administration of criminal justice. Some might not allow denationalization even then, holding it to be forbidden as a cruel and unusual punishment – the ancient cruelty of banishment. Be that as it may, the statute denationalizing expatriate draft-dodgers provides for civil proceedings only, not criminal safeguards, and so if the denationalization that it imposes is punishment, the statute is unconstitutional for this procedural reason, whether or not one deems the punishment cruel and unusual. This much is common ground.

Punishment as Sanction

But how do we tell whether denationalization is punishment? It is not enough that it hurts, that it may be seen as a sanction, for if anything is clear it is that we are not willing to surround all actions of government that fall painfully on the individual with the expensive and cumbersome panoply of criminal safeguards. Thus many forms of taxation hurt as much as, or more than, many criminal fines, but are imposed administratively or by other civil process. What we call a punishment – for lack of a better and more precise criterion – is only a sanction whose dominant purpose is retributive and deterrent. A sanction is not punishment if, like taxes, even though it hurts, it serves some dominant purpose other than merely to hurt. But punishment is also meant, in the end, to serve a social purpose separate from its own infliction, and to achieve this larger purpose, in this or that degree, on the individual concerned, and on others through its *in terrorem* effect. The distinction is that to qualify as not punitive, a sanction must have a conclusive regulatory effect on the individual on whom it falls, doing to him all that is necessary, but only what is necessary to achieve the immediate purpose, and not using him *pour encourager les autres*. But if a regulatory sanction falls on conduct the individual can avoid, as many taxes do, then every time it falls it will cause others to avoid that conduct. And thus punishment is in some measure a regulatory sanction, and all sanctions are in some measure punishment.

This is something of a circle. A regulatory sanction is defined as something that is not punishment, which is defined as something that is not a regulatory sanction. We have simply not developed conceptual tools that are precise enough to tell us when we require use of the criminal process and when we may dispense with it. And there is no help in a functional realism that purports to cut through the concepts and look for its criterion of decision to the actual consequences of the governmental action. This method either works out as more circular than anything else, holding that a sanction is punishment if a criminal stigma attaches to it – which, of course, it will not if we don't call it punishment; or it flounders about trying to determine which of many things that hurt hurt worst: *e.g.* does deportation of aliens hurt less than denationalization of citizens?

As to denationalization, however, there is a way out of the circle. But it leads into the frying-pan. If there is no power in the federal government to regulate natural-born citizenship, to define it and the conditions of its tenure, then denationalization cannot be a regulatory sanction, and may perhaps not even be imposed as a punishment. It cannot then be a suitable regulatory sanction, for there is nothing which it is suited to regulate that may legitimately be regulated. Seen this way, the issue loses its merely procedural aspect – "merely," because procedural defects can be cured; Congress can in future provide for jury trials. The issue then becomes one of ultimates, of ends, of the powers of government and their limitation by the Court. This is the ground on which the battle of constitutional philosophies was fought out in the past.

Justice Goldberg leaves this ground. He makes no attempt to determine, by deduction or *a priori* judgments of permissible governmental purposes, whether denationalization is always, or even just generally, a regulatory sanction or a punishment, and whether there is power to impose it as either. He asks, rather, an empirical question: whatever the other possible uses of the sanction of denationalization may be, is it perhaps clear in this instance, as a matter of actual legislative intent, that the dominant purpose in denationalizing wartime expatriate draft-dodgers was punitive? This is itself generally a difficult question, for the Court has no means of psychoanalyzing a past Congress and arriving at a judgment of its motives, and Congress' own debates do not often shed light on so

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subtle a question. The difficulty is indeed partly illustrated by the immediate statute here involved, which Congress passed with very little debate in 1944, at the behest of Attorney General Francis Biddle. But the difficulty is illustrated only if one views this statute in isolation. For there is also an illuminating prior history, which is worth, as Justice Goldberg says, quoting Holmes, a volume of logic. The 1944 statute is the last in a series dating back to the Civil War. Ample debates and other historical materials demonstrate that all the earlier ones were plainly thought of on all sides as punitive – retributive and deterrent. And Justice Goldberg persuasively – if perhaps not conclusively – argues the continuity of the latest from the earlier statutes.

The upshot is procedural, implying no final judgment about the powers of government. What is more, even the procedural judgment is applicable only in the peculiar circumstances of the present statute, which falls because it was demonstrably meant to be punitive and yet does not provide the procedural safeguards suitable to the infliction of punishment. But does Congress have power, without providing criminal safeguards, but also without retributive or deterrent intent, to regulate native-born citizenship and to decree that one who flees the jurisdiction to avoid a wartime draft has so far forgotten himself in the duties of that citizenship as to be deemed to have forfeited it? Congress has that power neither more surely nor more dubiously than it did before Justice Goldberg's opinion. May Congress, subject to the proper procedural safeguards, inflict loss of citizenship as a punishment for expatriate draft-dodging? Again, the decision does not answer this large question. For the moment, the debate is in recess. The ball is in Congress' court, not the Court's. Congress is free to address itself to these issues, and speak its will.

There is one incidental aspect of these Citizenship Cases that should not go unmentioned, though no doubt it is sheer sentimentality to emphasize it. It is far from unique. What it suggests is indeed a commonplace of our system. If its particular manifestation is relatively rare, that is because only a certain coincidence can bring it about just so. For very ordinary procedural reasons, the parties in these cases were, in the one, Robert F. Kennedy *v* Francisco Mendoza-Martinez, and, in the other, Dean Rusk *v* Joseph Henry Cort. Well, Kennedy and Rusk lose, of course, and their defeat is handed them by one who under the robes is their Cabinet colleague of just yesterday, Arthur Goldberg. This so meets our expectations that we are not startled, but it is rather nice.

Beyond Imperialism

by George Lichtheim

Has the colonial chapter really been closed, or is there some truth in the assertion that Western relations with the backward, tropical and subtropical countries have been no more than superficially revamped and are currently about to enter what is described as a "neo-colonialist" stage of economic exploitation veiled by the formal trappings of independence? The charge, when directed against Britain and France, is the more plausible since it can be argued that something of the kind has indeed marked the relations between the United States and most Latin American countries over the past century. It can also be held that, quite irrespective of power relationships, the "normal" exchange of goods and services between developed and undeveloped areas inevitably works out to the detriment of the latter, unless a conscious effort is made to correct the imbalance. The point at issue is not whether Western capital investment in the past – with or without overt political control, *i.e.*, "imperialism" in the strict sense of the term – has damaged and distorted the economies of backward areas, but whether this phase has now given way to a different kind of relationship.

Socialists have traditionally denounced the capitalist-imperialist nexus, without denying that it was responsible for *some* degree of progress. The current controversy turns upon the question whether "planned development – as instanced among others by the relations between the EEC and the African states – represents something radically new or a continuation of the old "unequal relationship" at a higher level.

European socialists – who have taken a prominent part in helping to liquidate the old colonial system – could in principle subscribe to all, or most, of the charges hurled against it by Leninists and/or radical nationalists and still maintain that it is absurd to talk

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George Lichtheim *is the author of* The New Europe, *published by Praeger, from which this article is drawn.*

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of neo-colonialism when considering the relationship of Asia or Africa to Europe under present conditions. They might also argue that it is perverse to saddle them with the sins of US "private enterprise" in Latin America. The analogy would hold only if Afro-European relations were typified by what has been going on in the formerly Belgian Congo since 1960. But, in fact, the extraordinary doings of the *Union Miniere* in Katanga represent a type of "monopoly-capitalist" activity that is rapidly going out of fashion. The notion that this kind of primitive skulduggery typifies the present order of things is really not worth controverting. Nor is it apparent that these antics form part of a global pattern that could with any plausibility be interpreted in Leninist terms, *i.e.*, as an attempt on the part of "the monopolists and their governments" to secure physical possession of strategic raw materials.

This point leads to what is really the decisive consideration, namely the growing irrelevance of theoretical arguments derived from the pre-1914, or even the pre-1939, era. Every year that passes makes it plainer that shortage of colonial raw materials, and the need by hook or crook to seize control of them, simply does not describe the reality of present-day industrial capitalism, whether planned or unplanned. The exact opposite is the case: Many of these raw materials are being superseded by industrial techniques making use of products available in the industrially developed countries themselves. The real danger facing the backward countries is that their exports will be squeezed out by the development of synthetics.

Statistics relating to the consumption of raw materials in industrial countries since the early 1950's indicate that the use of crude materials (cotton, wool, rubber, jute, copper, etc.) has lagged far behind the consumption of synthetics and other processed materials (synthetic rubber, aluminum, plastic materials and fibers, etc.). In consequence of these developments, the flow of capital tends to be diverted from extractive industries (mining, plantations) toward manufacturing. On balance, this is clearly an advantage to the developing countries, though of course it does nothing to solve their surplus-labor problem. The new forms of foreign investment are directly linked to new techniques, and they also demand workers with modern skills, though fewer in number than did the old mining and plantation economy, which reached its peak on the eve of the 1914-18 war. Even if it be argued that this inflow of foreign capital results in a political partnership with the local bourgeoisie, the latter is at any rate becoming a genuine entrepreneurial class (*i.e.*, in Communist parlance a "national" bourgeoisie) rather than a reactionary "comprador" class living off the crumbs of foreign exploitation. In fact, this is precisely what is happening; that it should be happening because Western industrial society has itself been revolutionized by new techniques is quite in accordance with Marxist principles – though Soviet propagandists have no interest in proclaiming the fact.

Under the Yoke?

Meeting in Tanganyika, February 10, the 60 member-delegations to the third Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference urged the "people of Asia and Africa to intensify their common struggle for complete eradication of colonialism and imperialist domination."

A resolution on economic exploitation said, "Although colonial powers concede political independence, they are nevertheless still interested in maintaining an economic basis for exploitation. The so-called aid program of imperialist countries hamper industrialization and do not create the bases for the development of the national economy."

The Leninist model of a stagnant Western capitalism clutching at the life line of colonial super-profits extrapolated certain features of an era that came to an end with the 1914-18 war, though even then the bulk of foreign investment did not go to the colonies, but to developed countries in Europe or the Americas. Since then, the economic importance of the colonial hinterland has dwindled to such an extent that it has become a major political preoccupation of the rival blocs (East and West) to raise public funds for development purposes, largely in the hope (which may be frustrated) of securing political sympathies and averting a desperate outbreak on the part of chronically underfed and overpopulated countries. Such private investment as can be prevailed upon – not without difficulty – to venture forth into the hinterland typically yields a lower rate of profit than capital invested in Europe or North America. The few notable exceptions to this rule – principally oil – do not seriously alter the general picture. Oil investments indeed belong to the earlier phase, which is why they are always quoted by writers anxious to prove that the Leninist model is still operative. In terms of the real problems encountered by countries such as India or Brazil, they are of course quite marginal, and where – as in the Middle East and North Africa – they have genuine importance, the post-independence pattern makes it certain that they are going to be used for the purpose of financing industrialization – as is right and proper. By contrast, the fantastic games still played in Arabia and along the Persian Gulf by newly oil-rich sheikhs and princelings make good copy for journalists and propagandists, but their political significance is minute.

In our age, when the emergent countries are clamoring for capital investments which the developed indus-

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trial centers are reluctant to make available, it may seem odd that nationalists should go on quoting Lenin's theses on colonial exploitation as a feature of the "highest" stage of a supposedly overripe and moribund capitalism; but such intellectual lags are not unusual. Moreover, it can be held that the emergent countries are entitled to demand planned public investment in basic services and/or modern manufacturing industries rather than a continuation of the old wasteful system, which developed a few sectors of the economy while distorting or neglecting the remainder. This is a legitimate argument between the Western countries and the ruling elites of their former dependencies. It has nothing to do with the weird notion that Africa is a stamping-ground for "monopolists" in search of profits denied to them at home. The real problem arises from the enormous claims levied upon the European countries by their less-developed partners, now understandably in a hurry to industrialize, and simultaneously faced with a population explosion.

In the case of Algeria, to take one notable example, it has been calculated that merely to hold living standards at their present level – in the face of a population growth curve that has doubled its numbers from 5 to 10 million since 1920 and promises to raise it to 15 million by 1980 – the former metropolis would have to invest between $5 billion and $6 billion in Algerian industry – exclusive of oil production and pipeline construction – over the next 20 years. A plan to raise living standards by two percent annually would require the investment of $10 billion; raising standards by four percent a year would call for some $20 billion by 1980. Clearly such efforts are more likely to be made (if at all) by a semi-authoritarian regime in France than by a parliamentary democracy dependent on the voters. This may be among the reasons why all factions of Algerian nationalism greatly prefer the Gaullist regime to its predecessor.

If the Leninist formula of equating capital exports with colonialism is outmoded, the nationalist argument that without massive injection of public capital the vicious circle of poverty, overpopulation and inadequate investment cannot be broken is well-founded. So is the insistence that such investments must in the main be guided to the key sectors of the economy, not left to short-range considerations of profitability. It is within these terms – familiar to European socialists, and increasingly to intelligent conservatives and liberals as well – that the argument now tends to work itself out. It gains nothing from being presented in terms of stale controversies between Leninists and *laissez-fairists*. Now that the leading European countries have been shorn of their colonial possessions (without suffering the threatened disaster), while their former dependencies are experimenting with "mixed" public and private economies, it becomes possible to transcend the dispute over "imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism."

Red China Today

I. Problem of a Nation in Isolation

by Jacques Jacquet-Francillon

When I arrived in Peking in the fall of 1958, at the height of the delusions of grandeur entertained by the promoters of the "Great Leap," I was struck by the reactions of individual Russians present in the Chinese capital (diplomats, journalists, technicians): reactions of alarm, almost of panic. Today, I am convinced that these reactions accurately reflected the state of mind of Russian officialdom when, from their offices in the Kremlin, they learned that China was suddenly turning a deaf ear to Soviet teachings and was now proclaiming to the world that henceforth, thanks to its gigantic potential for human investment and to the "enlightened thinking" of Mao Tse-tung, it proposed to leap over and past all the normal stages of development, thus leading the way toward the higher stage of Communist society. The

In the first of two articles Jacques Jacquet-Francillon, *the Far Eastern correspondent for* Le Figaro, *reports on the problems facing China.*

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"Timid as Mice"

On March 1, 1963, the party magazine *Red Flag* challenged "the modern revisionist masters [Khrushchev]" to publish in their press Peking's "side of the case." "If you are men enough," said the *Red Flag* editorial, "you will. But having a guilty conscience and an unjust case, being fierce of visage but faint of heart, outwardly as tough as bulls but inwardly timid as mice, you will not dare. Is that not so? Please answer."

first caustic criticism of the Chinese Communists made publicly by Mr. Khrushchev dates from that period. Without any fanfare, but with a persistence which has been relentless since that time, Khrushchev promptly set about translating his words into strong action.

For close onto four years now, neither the high points nor the low points of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policies, nor the succession of bright skies and storm-winds which has alternately shone and blown, ideologically speaking, on the Sino-Soviet quarrel, nor even the temporary relaxation of the Chinese Party's internal "line" (paradoxically even more "de-Stalinized" than that of the Soviet Party as a result of the circumstances prevailing in China) – nothing, in short, has altered the Soviet Union's new policy of abandoning China to its terrible problems of underdevelopment.

Thus, at the beginning of 1963, the former Middle Kingdom appears to be more isolated than ever before during its three thousand year history. The China of Mao Tse-tung has been thrown on its own, abandoned to its misery as well as to its sense of great mission; to its traditional wisdom as well as to its excesses. This fact is the key to the present behavior of the Communist leaders in Peking.

The purely ideological aspects of the differences which are creating an ever widening and more obvious gulf between Moscow and Peking are by now well known in the West. The Asiatic world, on the other hand, has shown little enthusiasm for intellectual jousting. To most Asians the external ideological aspect of Moscow-Peking relations is less important than political and economic conflicts of interest. Just as diplomatic observers in Asia like to believe that Japanese foreign policy is that dictated by the needs of Japanese foreign trade, so they assume that the ideological position of the Chinese Communists is imposed on them by their terrible problems of survival.

"No true Marxist-Leninist worthy of the name has ever been paralyzed by fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialists, nor has he ever for that reason abandoned his fight against imperialism and its lackeys. . . ." So reads the editorial blast published last December 15 by the *People's Daily* in Peking, and broadcast the same day in over thirty different languages and dialects.

It has often been said that China alone on our planet could survive the horrors of an atomic war without disappearing as a functioning national entity. This may be true; nevertheless, it is difficult to see how, under present conditions, the outbreak of general atomic war could benefit a China whose population is entirely occupied with the struggle against starvation, whose industry is barely functioning, and which, although it boasts the largest land army in the world, numerically speaking, will for many years to come still be lacking in nuclear power of adequate retaliatory strength. Of course it is always possible that the delusions of grandeur occasionally exhibited by China's leaders might lure them into a policy of "let the worst come." At present, however, their game seems more realistic and more subtle.

Spirit of Bandung

The China of 1953-57, which was benefiting by the full flow of Soviet technical assistance and economic aid, spoke an entirely different language from the China of 1963. In those days it was the apostle of the "Spirit of Bandung," and preached the "five principles of coexistence." How remote this seems from the harsher realities of today! 1959 was marked by the first repatriations of Soviet "experts" working in China. All who still remained departed en masse in August of 1960. At certain works, such as the colossal Sanmen Narrows Dam on the Yellow River, the Russian technicians departed and took with them the plans for carrying out the project they were directing, a fact which has been verified by extremely reliable sources. 1960 was also the last year when the Soviet Union delivered industrial products in the form of direct aid to its Chinese ally in any appreciable quantities. Russian exports to China, which has risen to 859.1 million New Rubles in 1959, fell to 735.4 million in 1960 and dropped to a mere 330.6 million in 1961 (in other words, a drop of 50 percent in one year). Moscow's imports from China dropped from 990.3 million NR in 1959 to 763.3 million in 1960, and to 496.3 million in 1961. The excess of China's exports over its imports (as shown by the above figures) which emerge as the total volume of Sino-Soviet trade drops, in no way indicates an advantage for Peking. Very much to the contrary, these figures are proof that, despite the seriousness of the food crisis and the sad plight of Chinese light industry, Moscow has continued to demand a progressive reimbursement of past aid in the form of deliveries of farm products and finished goods (mainly textiles). In its present propaganda campaign

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designed for domestic consumption, the Chinese CP also claims – and this is confirmed by various and specific pieces of information reaching Hong Kong – that the Russians now seek not only to obtain reimbursement for past economic aid, but also the repayment of assistance supplied in the name of military aid during the Korean War. Emerging from a dramatic three-year crisis which has forced it to mobilize all its vital forces and look toward an essential new start in its agriculture, China is in no condition to push even a modest industrial recovery without substantial foreign aid. Moscow has progressively withdrawn this aid from China, and is now refusing it point blank.

This is the real "treachery" of Khrushchev, not just "deviationism," "revisionism" and "chauvinism."

Mr. Khrushchev's adamant and hostile attitude can be attributed to several complex motives:

– to a fear which was made more acute by the crisis of China's "great leap forward." As I stated before, I witnessed the birth of this fear in 1958 among the ranks of the then numerous Russian colony in China. I encountered it anew in 1961, three years later, as strong as before, among the Soviet officials I met along the 8,000-kilometer length of the Russo-Chinese border in Eastern Siberia;

– to the discouragement he felt when Red China squandered the fruits of five years of extremely expensive economic aid, despite repeated warnings;

– to the danger of Chinese competition in the countries of the uncommitted world, particularly in Africa and Latin America.

– to the rapidity with which the Chinese chiefs took over as their own certain former frontier claims of the old China. The reasoning which Peking advanced to contest the validity of the McMahon Line could be equally well applied to the boundaries between Manchuria and the Far Eastern Soviet provinces (Region of Amur, Territory of Khabarovak, Primorje) which were unilaterally imposed in 1858 in the name of the Czar of all the Russias on the representatives of the then decadent Celestial Kingdom, through the Treaty of Aigun. Moreover, Peking still considers the territory of the People's Republic of Mongolia – a direct satellite of the USSR – as an integral part of China. The Chinese Region (so-called autonomous) of Inner Mongolia has for the past several years been the focus of intensive propaganda activity, especially the glorification of Genghis Khan, designed to arouse Pan-Mongolism.

The Golden Age of Chinese Communism – in other words the period when Moscow gave unstinting material aid to Peking – corresponded to a period of high international tension. The Khrushchevian era of "peaceful coexistence," on the other hand, has been marked by a policy of abandoning China to her own difficulties. There is thus a certain logic in the viewpoint, based on experience over the past years, that a return to a protracted climate of international tension might in the long run operate to China's advantage.

These are the considerations on the basis of which many Asians specializing in Chinese affairs explain, at least in part, the sudden belligerence of Peking in launching the Himalayan conflict at the end of October. They believe that during the months to come other moves may be expected from China aimed at inflaming the situation in Southeast Asia. There must be a reason, these observers point out, why work on a strategic highway to link Laos with Yunnan is at present being stepped up to a forced-labor pace. Had aerial surveillance of the area been maintained, it would have revealed that this work is even being carried on at night, by torchlight. And surely there is some reason why, since the end of September, the Chinese Communist banks have been systematically raffling all the Vietnamese piastres available in Hong Kong.

Hardening Policy Lines

Finally, the decisions approved last December by the Central Committee of the North Korean Labor (*i.e.* Communist) Party have put the West on the alert. This Supreme Council, which met in secret sessions through December 18, appears to have concerned itself primarily with military and security problems. The official communiqué, which was extensively publicized by the Peking press and radio, states that ". . . *the reinforcement of our defensive capacity must be given an absolute priority, even if this means a delay in the development of the national economy.*" According to certain specialists in Asiatic military problems, decisions of this sort presage a move to put North Korea on a wartime footing. This has aroused special concern in Japan.

Whatever the merit of these pessimistic prognoses, one point remains undisputed: Japan has been overcommitted to Washington for so many years that Japanese aid to China is out of the question. Only the Soviet Union can help, and there has not been the slightest change in Mr. Khrushchev's resolutely negative attitude in the matter of aid, despite certain Chinese ideological concessions in mid-1962.

As a result, China's leaders have no other alternative than to harden their present position. The only feasible ploy, in their eyes, is to try and prove the dangers of a "peaceful coexistence" policy and bring about a replacement of the Khrushchev team by persons more favorable to their cause. Their attempts over the past several months have, however, so far boomeranged (the reaction of the European Parties proves this), serving only to intensify China's isolation.

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Word, Words, Words

by Honor Tracy

There is possibly something to be said for hypocrisy after all. The readers of this volume will note that compared with Mr. Auden's poetry his prose is apt to be woolly and unorganized in style, insipid and occasionally foolish in content. At the same time they will find it steeped in Anglican simplicities and affections, with here and there remarks perceptive enough to atone for

The Dyer's Hand
and Other Essays
by W. H. Auden
(Random House; $7.50)

stretches of banality, intelligent and on the whole good-mannered. On balance, then, they may remember that Mr. Auden is before anything else a poet whose work has often reached the heights; and they may think that crumbs from such a table are more sustaining than whole dishes from another.

Characteristically, however, Mr. Auden will not leave us under any misapprehension. He will make no bones about the fact that essays, reviews, articles, the very Chair of Poetry at Oxford, are means to an end which is other and higher than the sustenance of the public. They are, he reveals, chores undertaken to make it materially possible for him to continue writing poems. The fact in itself is natural and forgivable and, indeed, what we should expect, yet Mr. Auden's candid avowal of it seems to erect a barrier between him and us. We lose what any critic should bestow on his reader both as welcome and as point of departure, namely, the feeling that we matter to him, that our views, and our reactions to his own, are in some way important too. We do not take part in a silent discussion here as much as tune in to an interior monologue.

The atmosphere of interior monologue is developed further by the subject matter, wherein all things great and small line up together and Caliban, the Fool in *Lear*, Verne's Passepartout and that bungling old autodidact Jeeves, for example, are gravely examined one after another; and also by the arrangement which consists in the greater part of a kind of island-hopping from one idea to the next. Mr. Auden tells us that this is done deliberately because systematic criticism is apt to be lifeless or even false, and that notes are to be preferred. But these "notes" are really no more than the *Pensées* of the French *moralistes*, and pensées must be sharp, brief and brilliant if they are to make up for the fact that they rarely contain more than half a truth at most. Thus André Gide may be in order when he defines a friend as someone with whom one does something disgraceful but Mr. Auden certainly is not when he spreads his own definition over forty lines and does no better. Indeed, some of his statements are the purest bosh, without any of the little sparkling grain of something that Gide's perversities have. To take an example, Mr. Auden tells us baldly that friendship is only possible between people who regard each other as equals: whereas the friendship of beings whose inequality is never in question, friendship such as we might have with one of vastly higher intellect to our own or, on the other hand, with a child or an animal, has a grace and sweetness all its own, calling up a particular tenderness on one side, a particular reverence and humility on the other. Indeed, after we have read the three dragging paragraphs on this subject, we may turn to *People and Places* No. XVIII: –

Lay your sleeping head, my love,
Human on my faithless arm . . .

and marvel at their originating in the one brain.

The freshest and most incisive ideas received from the book, then, are those of other writers because, having quoted them, Mr. Auden feels obliged to expound or contradict or water them down. It may be that he acquired this habit, together with his prolixity, in the Vaterland, a country whose thinkers have ever dedicated themselves with laudably single minds to the clarification of the obvious. When Yeats says

The intellect of man is forced to
choose
Perfection of the life or of the work,

he merely states with poetic emphasis a truth all serious writers face, a truth put with still greater emphasis in prose by Thomas Mann in *Tonio Kroger*: ". . . dass nur unter dem Druck eines schlechten Lebens kann gutes Werk entstehen, und dass man gestorben sein muss um ganz ein Schaffender zu sein" (that only under the stress of a bad – *i.e.*, an unlived, unfulfilled, unsatisfactory life – can good work result and that to be wholly a creator one must be dead). Auden the poet is surely aware of what Yeats the poet had in mind and of the poet's right to express a truth as he will: but up bobs Auden the Herr Professor and gravely admonishes him: "This is untrue: perfection is possible in neither."

A very marked quality in Mr. Auden is his intense awareness of belonging to a group – not a racial, sexual, social, or political group, but an intellectual one. He is very much the Highbrow and the Highbrow for some reason can never be simple about anything. Apparently he cannot, like the rest of us, just guffaw at the Marx brothers, revel in Wooster and Jeeves, delight in Mr. Pickwick, lose himself in a murder story, and let it go at that. Ah no. Some demon eggs him on to give the brainy reasons for his ordinary actions, reasons to show that while he may enjoy the pleasures of the man next door he does so in a different, loftier, more worthwhile way.

"Though the appeal of mythical characters transcends all highbrow-

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lowbrow frontiers of taste, it is not unlimited; every such character is symbolic of some important and perpetual human concern, but a reader must have experienced this concern, even if he cannot define it to himself, before the character can appeal to him. Judging by my own experience, I would say that *Pickwick Papers* is emphatically *not* a book for children, and the reflections which follow are the result of asking myself: 'Why is it that I now read with such delight a book which, when I was given it as a boy, I found so boring, although it contains nothing which is too "grown-up" for a boy of twelve?' The conclusion I have come to is that the real theme of *Pickwick Papers* – I am not saying Dickens was consciously aware of it and, indeed, I am pretty certain he was not – is the Fall of Man."

How clever can you get? This is no mere rhetorical outburst but an agitated appeal for information. It may be feared that at any moment now Mr. Auden will turn his attention to *Huckleberry Finn* and conclude that Mark Twain was unconsciously re-stating *The Pilgrim's Progress*.

The antidote for the passage above would be for the reader to open *The Pickwick Papers* and let the fog sail off on the rush of that glorious mad exuberance; but it may not even occur to him. It is Mr. Auden's prime defect as a critic that in spite of all the cultivation and the gentlemanly good sense and the right-thinking, he does not manage to send us hurrying back to the author as Virginia Woolf and Ezra Pound did, and Dr. Leavis does. It is not a question of agreement or disagreement but of temperature. "Goethe's *Faust* is full of great poetry and wise sayings but it is not dramatically exciting . . .": this statement is very true, especially as to the second half, but would it ever arouse the faintest interest in the play?

I must look out because Mr. Auden has some pretty severe things to say about the writers of unfavorable notices. Yet, putting both my function and my capacity at their lowest, $7.50 is still $7.50 and however anxious readers may be for Mr. Auden to continue writing poems, they may conceivably be glad to know what they are in for before laying their money down. But there is every hope that Mr. Auden may achieve his aim. This is a book for people who have "no time for reading" but who wish for one reason or another to appear well-read; and their number is legion.

Revolution in Education

by Ronald Gross

We are gradually gaining some perspective on the "Great Debate" which engulfed American public education in the 1950s. As the smoke clears, the most arresting fact is the colossal irrelevance of that whole controversy.

Education and the New America
by Solon T. Kimball
and James E. McClellan, Jr.
(Random House; $6.75)

While progressives and traditionalists clashed in ideological conflict, American education was actually being revolutionized on an entirely different front. What has made a difference in our schools during the past ten years has not been new principles, but new techniques. The vital reforms – teaching machines, televised instruction, national instruction, national curriculum revisions by academic scholars and scientists, greater attention to gifted students – have all been efforts to upgrade the performance of the schools rather than to change their direction.

It took the Cold War to bring the industrial revolution to education. Only when the schools became our first line of national defense did their doctrinal adherence to inefficiency become untenable. Unfortunately, the new school reforms, unlike those of the last great wave of experimentation in American education – Progressivism – were concerned solely with the *means* of instruction, and not at all with the *ends* of schooling. Educators accepted the Cold War demands that the schools be devoted to identifying "human resources" and processing them into the trained scientific and technical brainpower needed by the nation.

As a result there is hardly a piece of current educational literature worth the attention of the layman who is broadly interested in contemporary American culture. Invariably he finds himself bored and dispirited as he shuffles between the technical preoccupations of the practicing educators and the largely irrelevant controversies of their critics. What is conspicuously missing is imaginative consideration of educational purposes beyond the technical compulsions of the Cold War.

Education and the New America, the collaborative effort of an anthropologist and a philosopher, attempts nothing less than the revivification of serious thought about the purposes of American education. The book is erudite and sophisticated; a work on education for people who find that *Lolita* illuminates the values of contemporary American life better than the report of the President's Commission on National Goals.

> "The message of the educationists has gone stale even in their own mouths, and nobody outside of the 'profession' bothers to listen at all. . . . American educators know neither what constitutes an adequate education for the new society we live in nor know how to quickly and precisely change the conduct of our schools. . . . Since 1899 we have solved certain problems – how, for example, to build, finance, and police a national highway system; but we have failed to solve certain others – how, for example, to equitably finance medical care. Education falls clearly in the second category."

Thus do Kimball and McClellan begin their search for a new basis of educational discourse.

This "New America" is characterized by two chief institutions. One is the pathetically transient family, held together no longer by a religiously sanctified hearth or an economically compelling set of tasks, but motivated primarily by the vague "ache for self-fulfillment" of each member. The other chief institution is the giant organization of

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The Story of Spanish Refugee Aid

There are 100,000 Spanish Republican refugees, many of them old, sick, and destitute, living in exile in France. SPANISH REFUGEE AID (Honorary Chairmen, Pablo Casals and Salvador de Madariaga) a non-profit committee formed in 1953, has raised and distributed over $600,000 to help these forgotten refugees. SPANISH REFUGEE AID has given direct aid of $10 a month to more than 3,500 families, has sent more than 47 tons of used clothing abroad, and has provided sewing machines, carpenter's tools, dental care, etc. In 1961 we opened the Foyer Pablo Casals, a warm, friendly center for old Spaniards in Montauban, France which gives monthly food packages to 193 aged refugees. By keeping expenses to a minimum, SPANISH REFUGEE AID has managed to give the help which has made a difference in the lives of thousands of these victims of totalitarianism, but the need continues ever greater than our means.



Prison, Exile, Poverty

Ceferino G. served in the Republican army throughout the Spanish Civil War. When the Republic was defeated he was captured and was condemned to death. His brother was executed; he himself was resentenced to 30 years in prison. In 1946 he escaped to France. Since he contracted typhoid fever in prison his health has steadily deteriorated and he cannot work or afford treatment. His wife has had four operations, his five-year-old son has severe bronchitis. They live on $42 a month. He writes, "Can you help us?"

Will you help us to help refugees like Ceferino G.? Please give what you can for these Spanish Republicans who lost their homes and livelihoods defending the principles of freedom.

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one kind or another: corporation, union, government. The school is the bridge over which the child passes in moving from the privacy of the family to his public role in the corporate society.

The nearest thing to commitment, in such a society, is understanding: "a cognitive grasp of the natural and social world, unfettered by illusions of personal significance." . . .

> "Perhaps the final step in the democratic experiment is that the society no longer poses an ultimate meaning to life. Instead it builds within each individual such a complex sense of self that the person is forced to create meaning, order, and purpose for himself."

Kimball and McClellan's analysis of our plight is masterful. There are lapses, to be sure, when the prose slackens into a drone of data, and we are back in the seminar room with the professors muttering above their prayers. But more often than not their richly documented account enables us to see our personal problems of anxiety as rooted in the social structure.

Their judgment on the schools is severe but just. Much of contemporary education still consists of what Whitehead called "dead knowledge" – knowledge which the students do not make truly their own because it is not relevant to their experience and because the teaching does not make it so. "The only use of a knowledge of the past," Whitehead wrote, "is to equip us for the present." This is the perennial outcry of the educational reformer from Plato to Pestalozzi. What gives it added salience now is that we have lost or forsaken the traditional values which could be transmitted to the young. Religion, community, social roles no longer retain enough stability from generation to generation to offer models of maturity. For this reason, knowledge which genuinely equips one for the present and future is needed by everyone. In this sense Kimball and McClellan are trying to do nothing more – though certainly nothing less – than update John Dewey. They enjoin the schools to face the challenge not merely of industrial society, but of the "corporate society" which Dewey failed to envision.

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Do they succeed? The program they propose occupies a disappointingly small portion of the authors' large book, and it is vague and unenterprising. There are hints throughout of reforms which they deem advisable, but these are described only fitfully. For example, the authors suggest the possibility of using the children's group culture to motivate and re-enforce the learning process without adult supervision. Again, abhorring as they do the authoritarian pattern of current school organization, they hope for a freer structure of teaching and learning. But these ideas are not elaborated.

What the authors do describe in some detail is a curriculum designed to help students cope with the new America by understanding it. One of the chief disciplines turns out to be extremely reminiscent of what C. Wright Mills called the sociological imagination, an amalgam of sociology and anthropology which the authors for some reason quaintly rename "natural history." The other recommended studies are even more conventional: logic and mathematics, experimental science, aesthetics. "The teaching of these disciplines," the authors conclude, "is the prime obligation of our school system." And they add, apologetically: "We are well aware that it takes neither special courage nor exceptional insight to stand up in favor of intellectual discipline at a time when aggressive militarism depends on academic prowess." Despite the embarrassing coincidence: that their nostrum happens to be popular at the moment, the authors affirm that it is knowledge in these fields that "frees the individual from the pain of feeling robbed when paying the psychic costs attendant on living in our civilization."

There is something basically unpersuasive about this *melange* of progressivism (society has changed; we must change our schools) and conservatism (don't change them *too* much from what they're doing now). The lack of conviction stems from a debilitating contradiction in *Education in the New America:* if our educational system is, as the authors convincingly demonstrate, way out of kilter within the realities of American society, then it is inconceivable that the schools can be adequately reformed by the minimal changes they advocate.

ART

Kandinsky at the Guggenheim

Suddenly everyone's looking backward. Already seen at Utica, the resurrected Armory Show of 1913 will shortly reopen at its original stand, the 69th Regiment Armory. Concurrently, the Whitney is doing "The Decade of the Armory Show" to look at what happened to American painting following the great revelation. Later in the spring what is in some ways the most promising of all these ventures in retrospection will open at the Corcoran in Washington, a review of modern art in America from before the Armory Show – there really was some – up to 1940, or several years before American art is widely supposed to have started. With a museum world so long entranced with the search for the truly new and with the slack clearly not being taken up by the only two candidates in sight, Pop Art and the curiously titled "color painting" (differentiated from non-color painting?), there must have seemed a certain logic in turning back to the truly old. As in fashion and frontiers, so in art nothing is as truly old as that which once won favor as truly new, and here we are, back at our roots.

The Guggenheim for its part has brought together the largest exhibition of paintings by Vasily Kandinsky ever assembled, installed them attractively and chronologically down the spiral ramp and sat back to see if American art turns out differently this time, rather as the old Guggenheim used to sit back and wait for its collection of Kandinsky and Rudolph Baur to change people's days and ways sufficiently to evoke *ex voto* notes which could then be printed up in little pamphlets of unsolicited testimonials. There is thus an element of institutional piety in the show. It has been argued that some areas of 20th Century art could never have existed without Kandinsky, but what seems entirely certain is that without Kandinsky there would have been no Guggenheim Museum. The show is therefore a kind of Founder's Memorial Observance, as in the better schools and department stores. The Museum and especially its director, Thomas M. Messer, have knocked themselves out to make the observance ample. Together on the ramp are not only the Guggenheim's own considerable holdings with seven special loans from the Soviet Union, pictures not normally on public view in Moscow and Leningrad, but also, and perhaps even more astonishingly, a large number of paintings from the artist's widow, Nina Andreevskaya, and others from the collection, now state-owned in Germany, of Gabriele Münter, with whom he traveled widely before World War I. All told, 96 oils and 34 water colors illuminate the career from 1902 to the year of the artist's death in Paris, 1944.

Appropriately enough, this makes the most enchanting and entrancing exhibition of paintings the Guggenheim has yet put on. There is just enough development, or at any rate observable change, in Kandinsky's work through the years to bring out the implicit Ages of Man symbolism of Frank Lloyd Wright's great ramp. You look back, up a tier, down one, across the huge well, at the bright pictures in their slow spiral and the experience really does yield the lift to the spirit that Kandinsky and the old Guggenheim both hoped for man in non-objective art. The show is going to Paris, The Hague and Basel and a different version, simultaneously opened in California, will tour this country, but it's a safe bet neither show will elsewhere pro-

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

...to appear since *The Making of the President* . . . Mr. Burns' analysis illuminates the current debate over what [Kennedy] will . . . make of the office . . . Should be . . . the most hotly debated book of the year in Washington." ROSCOE DRUMMOND, *Saturday Review* says: "James MacGregor Burns has calmly tossed an unlighted time bomb onto the American political scene. Compulsory . . . and exciting reading . . . constructively disturbing. I recommend it to everybody." LIFE says: "A provocative theory about conflict between President and Congress." TIME calls the book "tantalizing." THE NEW YORK TIMES reports "... impressive research in a crisp, vigorous and readable prose." ATLANTIC: "One of the most significant political tracts in recent years." Enter the discussion yourself. Get a copy of "Deadlock" today. $5.95

THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY

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vide the pure delight the main one does at the Guggenheim. The experience of Wright's curved flow of domed space is peculiarly appropriate to these pictures.

Following the pictures down the ramp we almost get the impression that the "evolution" of Kandinsky is taking place before us, in some single, archetypal painting. This would start out in the early years of the century as a somewhat juicy scene of city or country life, a solitary walker along the bank of a sluice, or throngs of strollers crossing a bridge in Amsterdam, each of the strollers a single paint-stroke in a world of buildings, trees and water which is also clearly the manipulation of thick paint, even on a tiny surface. Presently the paint begins to dominate the subject. There is a brief spurt of pointillism in the broadest sense, with paint points glowing over the scene; these points are always "justified" in terms of the subject, yet they completely lack the fixing quality of Seurat's points; they do not communicate a world as if they were some strange system of spiritual half-tone dots; they only decorate a world, as if they were Japanese lanterns or Christmas tree lights.

Then the subjects grow more blurred, as if the brush were dragging over outlines of persons and places. The blur-drag becomes a pictorial element, but it too seems added to a scene. At this stage there is sometimes an amazing resemblance to early paintings of Charles Burchfield, in which, for example, the night wind is personified as it might be to a child hearing it from within his house.

Then, very slowly, the visual world drops out of vision completely. It really is a slow process and there are many pictures ambitiously labelled "Composition" or "Improvisation" which nevertheless are still peopled landscapes. Now is seen a kind of lollypop land, where brightly colored citizens stand or lie beneath trees that may well be made of candy. We are in the world of Johnny Gruelle. On the eve of World War I, a cannon-form appears in the flowing non-objectivity the pictures have now become, but in general the forms have all been transmogrified into billowing colored clouds, broken here and there by lines, as if solid objects had been caught up in some great wind and were being hurled about at a speed too great to permit accurate identification. We are, perhaps, in the world of L. Frank Baum.

This strange suggestion of art for children persists through the entire development. Later, at the Bauhaus, the chaos becomes not so much organized – it always was – as stylized into circles, triangles, arcs and lines. Now these hurtle about in the space of the picture. Later still, in Paris, there is the suggestion that the plane geometrical figures are being rearranged into more complex shapes, people standing against walls, for instance, as if now, at the end of the varied production, the chameleon forms were returning to the humble origins of people and places. That return was never made, but the sense of child-like innocence in the old-fashioned meaning never departed from the picture. This simplicity is a common note in our art, as in our literature. It runs from the Douanier to Buffet and it is particularly close to Kandinsky in the art of Paul Klee and Jean Miro. But there are profound differences, profound enough to place the work of Klee and Miro on a completely different plane from that of Kandinsky, however much they and others may or may not be indebted to the Russian for his discovery of non-objectivity. Like him, both use child-like forms, either those of very simply drawn people or those of geometry, but the word "use" is the important one. Miro's art is soaked in sex and the simple forms almost always turn out to be fairly directly concerned with that subject. Klee, on the other hand, presents the often terrifying vision of alienated man in the frightening modern world and does so through the vastly simplified forms that suggest child drawing. Kandinsky, employing similar terms, is doing neither of those things. He is in pursuit of pure form and is thus in some sense a Platonist. But the world of the Universals never existed, for Plato or anyone else, and it certainly did not reveal itself to Kandinsky. Absorbed by theory, he pursued pure form and ended up moving circles and triangles around a rectangular space as in a child's educational toy. From these arrangements comes a boundless capacity to give charm and delight, but the truly spiritual art must be sought elsewhere.

FRANK GETLEIN

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FILMS

War and Truce

The Four Days of Naples (MGM)
Nine Hours to Rama
(20th Century-Fox)
The Wrong Arm of the Law
(Continental)

"At the end of September [1943] the people of Naples rose and helped the Allied forces drive out the German garrison, but in retaliation the German army capriciously destroyed the priceless Neapolitan archives." Thus Denis Mack Smith in his history of Italy. The extent of the rising varies in estimate, depending on whether you are an ex-Partisan, a Rightist, or a German; but certainly something stirring happened between September 28th and October 1st, and this is the subject of *The Four Days of Naples*, a film directed by Nanni Loy. (He is also co-author of the screenplay, with three others, and co-author of the original story, with four others.)

The picture uses the tapestry method, four or five story-strands that eventually interweave: a small boy who is separated from his refugee mother; a gang of adolescent delinquents who break out of reform school by day to fight the Germans and who return at night; a young wife who is cut off from her home by street fighting; a weary ex-soldier, just released, who is conscripted by the Germans as soon as he plops into bed. Loy is obviously familiar with Rossellini's *Open City* and with numerous Soviet films of the twenties and thirties that dramatized the Russian revolution. He has attempted to reproduce their feeling of the city's streets as the Mother of Us All and the sense that, through a mosaic of small scenes, a large figurative portrait of a people is achieved. Loy fails: because in most instances he either strains the material past the content it will hold or else he pushes it out of natural shape into trite movie-scene form. We foresee that the boy will charge the tank innocently, as if grenade-throwing were a game, and will be killed. It is too pat that the partisan group in which the young wife finds herself includes her ex-lover. It is overly neat that the biggest coward among a group of hostages is the one Blackshirt. The film conforms so closely to Loy's idea of audience expectations that we sit back and watch it trying to tug heart-strings.

A few live moments. That fine actor Georges Wilson (of *The Long Absence*) supplies one, as the reform-school head at supper with the returned warrior-delinquents. Regina Bianchi bears some of the weight of the world as the small boy's worrying mother. And the highly ornamental Lea Massari, who played the "first" girl in *L'Avventura*, almost makes the role of the young wife credible. But it is irritating to watch a film by which one wants to be moved and to be shut out by the director and scriptwriters.

Nine Hours to Rama is another film that uses tapestry technique on an actual event – the assassination of Gandhi in Delhi on January 30, 1948.

The script was drawn by Nelson Gidding from Stanley Wolpert's novel – drawn and drawn and drawn. We follow the young assassin and the friend who was meant to help him; we follow the police inspector trying to protect Gandhi; we visit Gandhi; we flash back into the assassin's previous life (love-life, of course); we visit a prostitute with him in the present. In fact we find so many ways to fill in the time between morning and murder that it really begins to seem like nine hours. Spuriousness of writing, construction, and acting stamps the picture from beginning to prorogued end. There ought to be a pyramidal effect, heightened by the metaphysical inevitability of the murder of an apostle of non-violence: murdered by the people to whom he has subscribed his life. But little of this comes through. Some dignity is lent the occasion by a non-actor named J. S. Casshyap as Gandhi. The rest is so tedious, except for a few location shots, that one searches for distractions. There is mild Lewis Carroll amusement in the fact that the Hindu assassin is played in English by a German actor named Horst Buchholz and that his mentor, Selvrag Prahlad, is played by an Irish actor named Harold Goldblatt.

Peter Sellers makes two sorts of films. In the one kind he tries to act parts. The others are showcases for his glittering abilities as an entertainer. In the former he is sometimes good (*Lolita, Only Two Can Play*), sometimes lost (*Topaze, Waltz of the Toreadors*). In the vehicles he rarely misses. *The Wrong Side of the Law*, his latest film, is a vehicle. There is no shred of originality in the plot, yet – principally because of Sellers – it is generally amusing.

The story uses the old idea of the crook syndicate that makes a truce with the police because both are annoyed by a criminal intruder in the city and the syndicate wants to be free to deal with him. (See *M* for a serious version.) The invention of incidents is workmanlike rather than winged, but the dialogue is

?
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spruce and is batted about briskly by an able cast. Chief among these are Lionel Jeffries (the nervously screaming prison guard of *Two-Way Stretch*, here a vigorously ineffective police inspector) and John Le Mesurier, who looks like a Tenniel drawing, as the philosophic commissioner. Chiefest, naturally, is Sellers, who has a chance to do two accents, cockney and couturier French, and plenty of chances to exercise his razor-sharp timing. His modestly casual manner suggests that he is preoccupied with matters more important than the scene in hand but that he doesn't mind bowling us over with his gifts while passing through.

Other reviews of Orson Welles' *The Trial* have stated that K. was dynamited at the end. As I had written that K. resists execution, kills his executioners, and is laughing triumphantly at the end, I went to see the film again. Except for the last point, I am still not sure I was wrong. Lighted dynamite is tossed into the pit where the guards have pushed K., and in a long shot we see him pick up something to toss at the guards. I assumed it was the dynamite; what else would it be? Then in a longer explosion we see an explosion – not definitely in the pit; and as smoke mushrooms, the film finishes. The laugh stops with the blast, which does not prove that K. is dead. The first time I thought that he was not; now I think Welles meant it to be ambiguous. A clear view of the explosion actually in the pit or a glimpse of the surviving guards would have settled the matter. Either way, this last scene perverts Kafka, who put it unambiguously and unprefaced by any note of triumph.

The film's virtues and defects are underscored the second time. Dozens of Welles' effects are magical; but there is no line, meaning, goal. It is neither a political nor religious nor Freudian allegory (all of which the novel has been called) nor any other kind. Perkins' performance seems even more ruinous. The music sounds haphazard. The dubbing, particularly of foreign actors, is poor. I omitted to mention that Welles plays the advocate, looking like a balloon; appositely, his performance is inflated and insubstantial.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

"WHEN *the White House Press Secretary gets news-managed into a promise to hike fifty miles, that's news. But when he manages to unmanage the news by retracting his pledge, no doubt in return for onsite inspection of his unguided muscles, that's not news, managed or otherwise. It's just a broken pledge. That's not news, any more.*"

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TELEVISION

Don't Disturb the Children

"Life meanwhile – real life, with its essential interests of health and sickness, toil and rest, and its intellectual interests in thought, science, poetry, music, love, friendship, hatred and passions – went on as usual, independently of political friendship or enmity with Napoleon Bonaparte." – *War and Peace.*

It is harder to write a similar sentence about average people nowadays. No doubt Tolstoy's people of 1812 were entranced by orthodox religion, peasant superstition, French novels, and other interpretations of reality that kept them from seeing life clearly and seeing it whole; but these fancies were at least pluralistic and conflicting. It is characteristic of our mass-media that they interlock and reinforce one another. As our children grow up, the articulate interpretation of their experience, the language and style in which everything is communicated, and the commodities they use, increasingly converge to one interconnected world-view; there are fewer meaningful alternatives. An average boy or girl comes up to college pretty thoroughly brainwashed.

For instance, as Jason Epstein pointed out recently, librarians actively discourage the reading of the old eccentric children's classics because they are unhygienic, too difficult, or otherwise irrelevant to modern conditions. *The Junior Scholastic*, a magazine taught to captive audiences in the 5th grade, has news condensed from the usual syndicated press and will contain a cheery cartoon explaining that the future of science is safe in the care of Bell Telephone. A TV program called *Junior News* (Binghamton, N. Y.) is used as a basis for classroom work. And the schooling is ineluctable. In 1961, 60 percent of the 17-year-old population of the US graduated from high school, having followed a course more and more tightly standardized, scheduled, and graded – about 35 percent of the remainder being either rural or Negro and Latin-American drop-outs, groups that at present do not form opinion. (In 1900, six percent graduated from high school.) Rival world-views, whether folk, traditional, sectarian, or artistically and philosophically heretical, are less and less available; the exposure to the one world-view is always more intense and swamping. A growing child thus cannot help believing that what is selected by the news-services is *ipso facto* the news, or that what appears in TV programs and commercials *is* proper behavior and the only choosable standard of living, and that what occurs in school is the life of the intellect. And the same world-view is taken by his prestigious adults. Let me quote from the President's message on education, January 1963: "This Nation is committed to greater investment in economic growth, and recent research has shown that one of the most beneficial of all such investments is education. . . . Ninety percent of all the scientists that ever lived are alive and working today. Vast stretches of the unknown are being explored every day for military, medical, commercial, and other reasons." – Other reasons, O Galileo! O Darwin!

(Consider a corollary. Suppose a

We announce with pride that The New Republic's *theater critic,* Robert Brustein, *has just received the George Jean Nathan award for the best American drama criticism of 1962.*

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young fellow happens to become nauseous and disaffected from this "reality." He is not likely to know of other possibilities of philosophy, political dissent, religious faith, artistic tradition, free science. He is almost forced to withdraw into his own guts, perhaps with the aid of hasheesh, or to exploit the public style as a hipster for his private power.)

I offer these melancholy reflections having before me a manual of children's television, *For the Young Viewer*, concocted by the National Association of Broadcasters, enlisting the services of an Educational Psychologist, an Educator, and a Psychologist, and describing 425 programs selected for merit – from *précis* on anonymous 5 x 8 inch cards, but without actually viewing the programs. This is an odd procedure in so delicate an area where, one would have thought, the chief effect on a child would be in the presented tone and personalities, the amount of spuriousness of the adults, the amount of confusion in the pacing and drawing, the amount of torture of the child or animal participants.

The book is entirely a *status quo* corporation promotion. At no point in its 180 pages does it mention the commercials that interrupt or are interwoven with the programs; and its argument is dedicated to cadging the largest common denominator audience, blurring differences of sex, age, etc. "It is important to note," the Psychologist tells us, "that the generalizations that can be made about child development apply to both boys and girls, and no real need exists to create programs for each sex, even if this were possible." "We customarily think," says the Educational Psychologist, "in terms of age levels, yet this is unwieldy because, with the exception of pre-schoolers, there is rarely a time when one age group is present to watch programs to the exclusion of other age levels. . . . Our categories [of the 425 programs] have placed emphasis on the *activities* of children." The categories are Exploration, Doing, Storytelling, Orientation, and Multi-purpose. Stretching from age 5 to 16, for both sexes, this classification does not (for me) cast any light whatever. The publisher is McGraw-Hill.

Here are some psychological observations on the tone and style of improper programming to be avoided: "[A] hazard of having children on camera . . . [is the] difficulty of controlling what they will say." "A pre-schooler or six-to-nine-year old youngster may respond to a 'bad' cat or puppet, but will not respond favorably to a 'bad' little boy or girl on camera. This kind of confrontation is likely to irritate young people, perhaps because it may be too close to home." "Situations in which children are insolent to authority-figures in the adult world (*e.g.* policemen) are likely to reinforce negative attitudes toward such officials." "Situations that may frighten young viewers are those in which a character with whom they identify is threatened; stories in which the identity of the 'good' character is not clear; situations in which a real fear of the child, like the fear of darkness, is suggested." "A threatening situation that has not been resolved at the conclusion of the broadcast may be frightening to children." "The ideal program does not require things that are inaccessible to the child or that may be frowned upon by his parents because they may dirty the house."

Positively, on the other hand, "A desirable aspect of programs involving animals is that animals do things that the child likes but is rarely permitted to do, like playing with water and mud. The viewer can obtain a secondary gratification by seeing animals engaging in those activities." "Either-or kinds of characters that are clear-cut, as in the Westerns, are likely to be minimally disturbing." "The child enjoys fables because the maxim that caps the moral is usually something that the child has heard from adults. The maxim enables the child vicariously to visit the adult world."

This kind of brainwashing, interlocked with school, children's so-called books, and suburban mental hygiene, does not leave much chance of intelligible contact with reality – the raw facts of life are left raw. An all-catching network of this tone and content does not provide the criticism of life that literature and art are supposed to provide. The usual dangers to children that are attributed to TV, like triviality or emphasis on violence, are far less virulent than the brute fact that TV is handled as a mass-medium, conveying the one, unobjected to, marketable world-view, a kind of catholic orthodoxy of a low grade. Indoctrinated with it, children grow up to be the collegians who believe that Nothing Can Be Done; or if they are suddenly disabused of this orthodoxy, either by their own vitality or because of unusual stresses and strains of real life, it is not surprising if they turn to private or marginal ideas, or to making no sense at all.

The actual children's TV programs are, of course, less disastrous than the theory of them in *For the Young Viewer* elaborated from *précis* on 5 x 8 cards. For this report I watched a number of them, and they mostly have the (less brainwashing) defects of the rest of TV. They are jumpy and fragmented. They are strangled by a format imposed on them to hold them together as an identifiable package. They create anxiety by their haste and greedy crowding of every second, and by their avoidance of the untoward. They try too hard for fun and sensation rather than allowing beauty and feeling to breathe and happen. Mature wisdom, wonder and dismay, that permeate all fine works, including works that children have loved, are resolutely excluded apparently on the theory that children are fools. The programs are manufactured; one has the omnipresent feeling that the authors are not expressing themselves but are manipulating and talking down. And the programs are, sometimes pleasantly and

Notes on Contributors

Honor Tracy *is at work on a new novel.* Ronald Gross *is the author of* The Teacher and the Taught.

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sometimes painfully, interrupted by lively and vulgar commercials – for which, at about age 12, *Mad* magazine begins to be a lively, but badly drawn, antidote.

The ideology of children's TV is undisturbed socialization to a kind of ideal suburb full of wholesome Activities. The actuality of the programs is plastically ugly, sexless, venal, harried, useless, desperately kindly against odds – not much different from the ordinary environment that small American children are really subjected to. They do little extra harm except keeping the children from outdoors or games or solitary fantasy. They probably increase vocabulary among underprivileged children who have difficulty in reading.

PAUL GOODMAN

Correspondence

Church-Related Schools

Sirs:

As a high school teacher I have found your recent articles on education, particularly those by Christopher Jencks, consistently interesting and discerning.

I am not so sure, however, about your comments on "Church-Related Schools" (March 2) particularly when you ask "would the public schools be hurt if more children were in Catholic or Anglican or Lutheran schools? Wouldn't smaller enrollments be better for the public schools?"

It is not so much the number of students channeled into non-public schools, but the *type*. Parochial (and particularly private) schools are more likely to draw from the higher socio-economic and intelligence levels. Furthermore, students with severe learning problems or handicaps, and the badly-behaved, are shunted into the public schools. As a result a disproportionate share of our public school students are inferior from the standpoint of intellect, motivation or behavior.

The parents of these troublesome students (often the real cause of the trouble) usually have little or no interest in the public schools, or in supporting them. And of course we cannot expect parents whose children are in private or public schools to be eager to pay higher taxes to the public schools.

Your suggestion of further aid to non-public schools will accelerate the undesirable trends noted above, and eventually the great bulk of our public school pupils could be like the dull, indifferent, badly behaved minority which is causing so much trouble today, and public support of the schools would be even weaker than it is now.

John L. Schneider
Minneapolis, Minnesota

You surely can not believe, as you imply ("Church-Related Schools, March 2, 1963) that "it makes no difference" who teaches history, so long as history is taught. The perversion of history is too long a tragedy in human civilization to be forgotten now.

Truth – in history, in chemistry or in astronomy – to be free, must be tentative; there is no thought but free thought; all else is sophistry and special pleading. The life blood of our pluralistic society is the interaction of free minds, without prejudgment and without dogma. Any organization, clerical or other, in that society which arrogates to itself the ultimate truth

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and sets a doctrinaire bound upon critical inquiry, is unfit, therefore, to instruct the young – even in arithmetic. To teach children by word or by example that it is wicked to read certain books and righteous to forbid them to others, that reasonable social measures violate the will of God and that the public needs a guardian is to destroy the genius of man. Schooling in this authoritarian context, no matter how many "facts" it imparts, subverts the spirit of education. It would seem only fair that those who wish it this way should pay for it themselves.

Roland P. Mackay, M.D.
Professor of Neurology
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

I am disturbed by the tendency of the editors to produce irrelevant conclusions from their own pointed observations. Specifically, I refer to the unanswered implication of the "final point" in "Church-Related Schools" (March 2, 1963) – "Some who object to any further aid to church-related schools" do so less for reasons of legality than because they believe the public school system is a unifying force in a pluralistic society, and that nothing should be done which weakens that system." A good observation, but then the question is asked (and answered) "But would the public schools be hurt if more children were in Catholic or Anglican or Lutheran schools?" This is irrelevant. The objection has to do with the effect of church-related schools on the unity of national religious and social groups, not on the physical effect of public school classes. I believe the objection is valid. Not only do church-related schools tend to create psychological ghettos on a religious basis but do so on a nationality basis to the extent that a given nationality is dominated by a particular church. (How many Italian Calvinists do you know?). Who knows what damage is done to ethnic and social integration by having one's baptism determine his teachers, friends and social identity?

Richard Guyton
Lima, Ohio

The Sponsor and TV

Sirs:

Paul Goodman's pieces about television are extremely interesting. But it seems to me he falls into the pattern common to most critics of television, that of holding the sponsor and his commercials responsible for all the shortcomings of the medium. Even if there weren't a commercial on the screen or a sponsor in the offing, a good half the programs – and most of these in the ambitious, for-the-public-good half – would still be insufferably dull, because the medium of television keeps trying heroically to do what can only be done effectively and adequately by radio or the printed word.

For most educated people the most satisfactory way to grasp one man's ideas is by reading them in a book or magazine. But a forum on which several speakers exchange ideas can be very exciting, and we used to have many of these on radio – before radio was pushed off the scene by the new notion that since we *can* see everything we will want to. Of course we don't want to: what is the advantage of *seeing* a group of men talking, or a symphony orchestra playing? For a demonstration of the difference the medium makes to intelligent speakers themselves, I suggest that Mr. Goodman listen to some of the tapes made by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, which the Fund for the Republic makes available to educational FM stations.

Television is for spectacles – for sports, for inaugurations, for big visual news breaks, and of course for movies. To expect it to carry a serious intellectual or musical load is like asking *Life* magazine to take over for *The New Republic* and *Foreign Affairs*.

Leila Engel
Bloomington, Indiana

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It is easier to keep on building Minuteman and Polaris rockets as fast as available production facilities permit than it is to devise an adequate agreement on arms control that Russia would be willing to accept; but if we continue to follow this line of least resistance, we shall, before long, reach a point of no return in an all-out arms race.

There are many people within the Administration and in the Congress who are deeply disturbed about the general drift towards war. The Council for a Livable World believes that it should be possible for these people to reach a consensus on what needs to be done. It is one of the functions of the Council to assist in clarifying some of the more complex problems by bringing to Washington from time to time, scientists and scholars with a special competence and interest in these issues.

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